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The Influence of Think Tanks on United States Foreign Policy:  
The Case of President Obama and Iran 
 
Tania Nassim Bougebrayel 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In an attempt to help bridge the gap between policy research and policy outputs, this 
thesis examines the role of research institutions, or think tanks, as domestic factors of 
influence on United States foreign policy. A case study is presented which examines the 
foreign policy outputs of President Barack Obama’s administration towards Iran with 
respect to policy research recommendations made by analysts, scholars, and fellows in 
four major think tanks in the United States. This thesis seeks to accomplish two tasks. 
First, it attempts to establish the contribution of think tanks to foreign policy decision 
makers. Second, it examines the relationship between think tanks and other domestic 
factors which contribute to making think tanks one of the most important domestic 
factors of influence on United States foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The process of foreign policy making in the United States is a complicated and 
multifaceted one. Foreign policy is conducted in different environments and often is 
described as a “dual” or “nested” game, implying several levels and factors of 
influence.
1
 Scholars continue to debate on the factors that influence policy and the 
success or failures of these influences. In addition, much debate continues in the field of 
international relations on the relationship between research and policy. At the heart of 
this argument lie policy research institutions commonly known as think tanks.   
Varying in size, scope, resources, and areas of specialization, think tanks play an 
important role in policy making in the United States. The primary purpose of think tanks 
in the early twentieth century was to promote scholarly research. However, since their 
inception, think tanks have become more than just research institutions, but also a vital 
resource for policy makers by directly and indirectly influencing the policy-making 
process.
2
  
In order to better understand the relationship between foreign policy making and 
the role of think tanks, this thesis asks several questions. First, can think tanks contribute 
to foreign policy decision making? If so, due to their expanding nature, can think tanks 
be seen as a domestic source of influence on United States foreign policy? Furthermore, 
due to the complexities and dual nature of foreign policy decision making, what 
revelations can be made about the relationship between think tanks and other sources of 
                                                          
1 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized World (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2008), 1-10.  
2 Donald Abelson, American Think Tanks and their Role in US Foreign Policy (Great Britain: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 
1996), 65-67.  
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domestic influence? In order to answer these questions, a proper research framework 
must be created. However, before this framework can be established, a better 
understanding of the relationship between theory, research, and policy must be formed. 
By using previous frameworks established on the relationship between theory, research, 
and policy, I will better be able to refine my own framework and methodology in hopes 
of showing the contributions of research institutions to United States foreign policy.  
The first framework which examines the relationship between theory and policy 
is provided by Stephan Walt. Walt, in “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in 
International Relations,” is critical of the current norms that exist in the field of policy 
making including the wide gap between academic theories of international relations and 
the actual practice of foreign policy making.
3
 In his argument, Walt explains several 
factors that show why policy and theory rarely meet, many of them resulting in a gap in 
the academic world. He also cites the widening gap between academic scholars and 
policy-oriented analysts and argues that the solution to closing these gaps lies in altering 
the norms of the current international relations academic discipline.
4
  
In addition to theory and policy, there are frameworks that examine the 
relationship between research and policy. David Baldwin in “Success and Failure in 
Foreign Policy,” highlights the inconsistencies between policy journals and rigorous, 
academic journals. Baldwin attempts to create an analytical framework that can judge 
“the success of peacekeeping operations, economic sanctions, military undertakings, and 
other types of influence attempts.” 5 Perhaps the most convincing portion of Baldwin’s 
argument is his conception of success which he says is difficult because measuring 
                                                          
3 Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” Annual Review of 
Political Science, 3 (2005): 25.  
4 Ibid, 33-43.  
5 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (2000): 170.  
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success is “slippery,” “misleading,” and “multiple.” Baldwin essentially argues that there 
are many dimensions to measuring success and failures in foreign policy, none of which 
are simple. He concludes his analysis by claiming that what is needed is more 
knowledge in the field of policy making which can only be provided by further 
understanding effective policy instruments as well as developing concepts and analytical 
criteria that “permit the comparison of alternative techniques of statecraft.”6 
There are two points established by Walt and Baldwin that were beneficial in 
formulating the logic for this thesis. First, Walt highlights the widening gap between 
theory and actual policy making. Secondly, Baldwin explains the difficulty of measuring 
the success of research as policy outputs. This thesis seeks to work between these two 
frameworks in hopes of highlighting the contribution of think tanks as research 
institutions to foreign policy. Since success of research recommendations is difficult to 
measure, proving influence of think tanks on foreign policy decision makers will be very 
challenging. Rather, as both scholars agree, what is needed is more research on the 
subject and a deeper understanding of policy options which is what this thesis hopes to 
provide. 
The goal of this thesis is to increase understanding and knowledge on policy 
options provided to decision makers in hopes of working towards closing the gap 
between theory, research, and policy. In order to do so, this thesis will seek to establish 
the contribution of think tanks to foreign policy as well as the relationship between think 
tanks and other domestic factors of influence in the United States. Before diving into a 
methodological framework for analyzing policy recommendations, a literature review 
will examine different aspects of foreign policy including different levels of analysis as 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 171-180.  
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well as varying factors of influence. Establishing a thorough literature review is essential 
in that it provides a deeper understanding of the complexities of foreign policy making 
within the United States as well as begins to highlight the relationship between different 
factors of influence on policy making.  
In order to establish whether or not think tanks do contribute to foreign policy in 
the United States, a case study will be provided which includes policy recommendations 
for the Obama administration to take towards Iran from four established think tanks in 
the United States. The case study focuses on the relationship between the Obama 
administration and Iran for several reasons. First, the relationship between Tehran and 
Washington became more antagonistic under President Bush and the neoconservatives. 
Following a policy of complete isolationism, the Bush administration made several 
miscalculations about Iran’s internal dynamics and the regional environment and by 
doing so, the administration lost the opportunity to “generate real momentum in Iran.”7 
The Bush administration’s policies left Washington in an even more difficult position 
with Iran, a position that was later inherited by the Obama administration. Furthermore, 
during his campaign, Barack Obama pledged to open dialogue with Iran without 
preconditions, a policy that was in direct contrast of the previous administration. This 
case study will see if these stark differences in policy approaches will soften the 
relationship between Iran and the United States. Secondly, Iran is a powerful player in 
the Middle East whose decisions impact the entire region. As such, the policies of the 
United States and particularly the Obama administration have an impact on the entire 
                                                          
7 Suzanne Maloney, “U.S. Policy Towards Iran: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward,” The Fletcher Forum for 
World Affairs 32, no. 2 (2008): 27-28. 
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region. Finally, the case of the United States and Iran can be used as an example of 
policy towards regimes which are neither democratic nor friendly towards the US.  
The policy recommendations will be analyzed in light of the policy outputs of the 
Chief Executive, or President Barack Obama. Executive orders will be used as examples 
of policy outputs from President Obama. By grouping together policy recommendations 
based on foreign policy strategy and comparing them to the decisions made in the 
executive orders, I hope to highlight similarities, if any, between policy 
recommendations and actual policy decisions. In essence, the decisions of the Obama 
administration will be examined with regards to policy recommendations of think tanks 
in hopes of establishing a link between research and policy and in attempts to show that 
think tanks can help “bridge the gap between the worlds of ideas and actions.”8 
While this thesis seeks to establish the contribution of think tanks on foreign 
policy by examining policy recommendations in light of executive orders, this only 
represents a small piece of a large policy making puzzle. While think tanks play an 
essential role in policy making, it would be incorrect to assume that they are the only 
factor that influences foreign policy decision makers. The argument presented here is 
aware that foreign policy decision making does not occur in a vacuum, but rather, that 
there is a multitude of influences in the decision making process. As such, the second 
question this thesis seeks to answer is what revelations can be made about the 
relationship between think tanks and other sources of influence within the United States? 
During the preliminary stages of research for this thesis, many additional questions arose 
regarding factors of influence including how do partisan relationships between the 
                                                          
8 Richard Haass, “Think Tanks and the U.S. Foreign Policy: A Policy-Maker’s Perspective,” U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agenda 7, no. 3 (2002): 5.  
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variety of foreign policy decision makers and think tanks influence policy suggestions 
and outcomes and what role do other domestic factors of influence have on research 
institutions and on policy makers? These questions will hopefully be answered by 
searching for domestic factors of influence on the think tanks. In other words, after 
sorting through the policy recommendations which will be done to create a link between 
research and policy, I will next attempt to group together common themes which occur 
within the different think tanks to highlight and examine the relationship between think 
tanks and other domestic factors of influence in the United States.  
Finally, I hope to draw conclusions based on my research findings by creating 
links between think tanks and executive orders as well as think tanks and different 
domestic factors of influence. I hope to increase understanding on the relationship 
between research and policy as well as highlight the complexity of foreign policy 
decision making in the United States which may perhaps inspire further studies on the 
topic. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature review for this thesis is vast and attempts to cover many aspects of 
foreign policy factors of influence. However, before any factors can be examined, a clear 
definition of foreign policy must be established. According to Laura Neack, defining 
foreign policy is the first step in studying the subject. Neack cites several definitions of 
foreign policy as given by policy experts. Charles Hermann, for example, sees foreign 
policy as a “neglected concept”… [that is the]... “discrete purposeful actions that results 
from the political level decision of and individual or group of individuals...[It is] the 
observable artifact of a political level decision. It is not the decision, but the product of 
the decision.”9 Neack believes that Hermann’s view is that of a minority of scholars and 
says policy must involve both the study of formulation and implementation, which she 
refers to as “how certain goals arise and why certain behaviors result.”10  
 The definition of foreign policy that will be used in this thesis is given by 
Deborah Gerner who defines it as: “the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor—
often, but not always, a state—directed toward the external world and the response of the 
other actors to these intentions, statements, and actions.”11 Even though it is Gerner’s 
definition of foreign policy that will be a starting point for this literature review, the 
definition given by Neack is also helpful because both descriptions make reference to 
different entry points for the study of foreign policy, also known as levels of analysis, 
which will serve as a macro framework for this literature review. The level of analysis 
                                                          
9 Neack, 9.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.  
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framework will allow for deeper analysis of the influential factors on foreign policy 
decision making. This will create a transition into the approach used by this thesis, 
which uses think tanks and executive orders to show a correlation between research 
institutions and policy outputs. Lastly, a few definitions will be given which better 
explain some concepts and key terms used throughout the research.  
2.1: Levels of Analysis   
Having established a definition of foreign policy, this research continues by 
using international relations theory found in Man, the State, and War by Kenneth Waltz. 
Waltz’s three images, or levels of analysis, provide an excellent starting framework for 
examining different levels of influence on foreign policy including the individual, the 
state, and the system. Waltz’s meta theory of international relations is used as an entry 
point for middle range theories provided by other scholars that focus on the individual, 
state, or systemic factors of influence. What this research has shown is that within each 
level of analysis lie a multitude of factors that influence foreign policy decision makers. 
 Kenneth Waltz, father of structural realism, examines several key assumptions 
which occur in the field of international affairs in Man, the State, and War. In his book, 
Waltz describes three separate images or levels of analysis—individual, state, and the 
system—as a means of understanding the causes of international conflict. The first 
image, the individual, is used by Waltz to describe the role the individual decision 
makers play. Waltz divides the scholars who study the human nature of man into two 
categories: the pessimists and the optimists. The pessimistic scholars claim that war has 
its roots in the heart of man, and as such, cannot be changed. Rather, the evil nature of 
man will dominate in his discourse and decision making. As a result, pessimists look for 
 9 
 
political remedies as a solution.
12
  In addition, Waltz explains that by "seeing the cause 
of war in men, [the optimists] seek to change them.”13  With regards to the optimistic 
scholars, Waltz is critical of them in that he finds them to be naïve and politically 
ignorant calling their peace-keeping solutions “either hopelessly vague or downright 
impossible.”14  
Waltz’s second level of analysis or image focuses on the characteristics within 
the nation-state that influences decision making such as “the nature of a state's political 
institutions, its modes of production and distribution, the quality and origins of its elites, 
and (sometimes) the characteristics of its people. [These characteristics] determine 
whether that state will be peaceful or belligerent.”15  Waltz comes to the conclusion that 
states are either bad or good, and as a result, the actions of the state will either result in 
conflict or peaceful actions.
16
 
The third image is the international system in which states interact with each 
other. In an anarchical society, states are in a constant power struggle with one another. 
According to Waltz, “in anarchy there is no automatic harmony” and that “among 
autonomous states, war is inevitable.”17  This level of analysis examines the balance-of-
power theory and helps students of international affairs understand why, under an 
anarchical system, a state behaves in a certain way in order to protect its own interests 
and maximize its power.
18
 
                                                          
12 J. David Singer, “Review of Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis by Kenneth N.  
Waltz,” World Politics 12, no.3 (1960): 454. 
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965): 42. 
14 Ibid, 65. 
15 J. David Singer, 457. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, 186. 
18 J. David Singer, 458-460. 
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Waltz examines the significance of each level in relation to each other in order to 
have a thorough understanding of political actions. He states, “The third image describes 
the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no 
knowledge of the forces that determine policy; [conversely] the first and second images 
describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to 
assess their importance or predict their results.”19  While this statement implies equal 
importance placed on each level of analysis, Waltz believes that the third level of 
analysis best describes the actions of a state in that it offers "a final explanation because 
it does not hinge on accidental causes-irrationalities in men, defects in states."
20
 
The three images presented by Waltz continue to be a topic of debate amongst 
scholars. In order to establish which level or image is the most effective in describing the 
catalysts of foreign policy outputs in the United States, each level must be further 
explored. The work of scholars, foreign policy experts, and political analysts will be 
examined in order to first determine which level of analysis most impacts foreign policy 
decisions in the United States. 
2.2: Individual Level of Analysis 
 The first level of analysis, the individual, is needed to better understand the role 
of the leader in foreign policy decision making. There is much debate amongst scholars 
still today about the importance of the leader in determining actual foreign policy 
outputs. Supporters of the first level of analysis believe that the personal characteristics 
are the most important factor in determining foreign policy.
21
 Skeptics, on the other 
hand, give a variety of criticisms for why political leaders are not the most significant 
                                                          
19 Kenneth N. Waltz, 238. 
20 Ibid, 231-232. 
21 Maurice A. East et all., Why Nations Act (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978): 50.  
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aspect of the decision making process including limitations due to social factors, similar 
policy decisions made by different personalities, and bureaucratic constraints.
22
 For the 
purpose of this research and for the purpose of deciding which level of analysis best 
explains the most influence in policy making, several opinions are needed on the 
importance of the role of the individual.  
 Kenneth Pollack and Daniel Byman, in their article “Let Us Now Praise Great 
Men: Bringing the Statesmen Back In,” find the tendency of scholars to ignore the role 
of the individual and his/her personality troubling. They argue that over the years 
scholars have either been too modest or too arrogant in their analyses of the role of the 
individual. For this reason, Pollack and Byman seek to “rescue men and women, as 
individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them.”23  The 
authors’ argument is established in several sections. First, Pollack and Byman attack 
several notions established about the individual. For example, while they commend the 
attention given to the role of the individual by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State, and 
War, the authors disagree with Kenneth Waltz’s assessment that human nature is 
constant. In contrary, Pollack and Byman argue that there is a wide range of variance in 
personality and that these variants in personality result in a multitude of actions and 
decisions.
24
   
The second section of their argument is a number of case studies of leaders that 
have had a significant impact on the foreign policies of their countries including Adolf 
Hitler, Otto von Bismarck, Wilhelm II, Napoleon Bonaparte, Saddam Hussein, and 
Hafiz al-Assad. From these two sections, the authors create thirteen hypotheses that 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 Daniel Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” 
International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 109. 
24 Ibid, 111-112. 
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either describe individual behavior or describe how individuals matter.
25
 Lastly, the 
authors conclude that the role of the individual is essential in understanding the actions 
of the state as well as to discredit what the authors call the “cult of international 
relations—inevitability,” which states that because a certain event occurred, it does not 
mean it was fated to do so.
26
  
Robert Jervis also examines the role of the individual in his article “Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics.” Jervis first examines three different levels 
of analysis that could be used to predict the behavior of the individual actor: 
international, domestic, and bureaucratic. Jervis uses these levels of analysis to show that 
no matter what context is used to analyze the situation, it is near impossible to explain 
important decisions and polices without knowledge of the preference and worldview of 
the individual leader.
27
  Jervis concludes with a two-step model that relates actor images 
and perceptions to the actor’s understanding of reality based on available information 
which he hopes will help explain some state behavior and actor misperception.
28
  
Jack Levy’s “Misperceptions and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and 
Analytical Problems,” also sheds light on the role of individual perceptions and the 
actions taken by the state. Levy criticizes the lack of importance given to misperceptions 
by political scientists. As a result, he states that capabilities and intentions are the central 
forms of misperception, and he focuses his discussion on misperception of adversary’s 
capabilities, misperception of adversary’s intentions, and misperception of third states. 
He then links these misperceptions to possible causes for war followed by an analysis of 
                                                          
25 Ibid, 114-145. 
26 Ibid, 145. 
27 Robert Jervis, “Perception and Misperception in International Politics,” In International Relations Theory: Realism, 
Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, Eds. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 257-
266. 
28 Ibid, 266-268. 
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conceptual and methodological problems resulting from misperceptions of capabilities 
and misperception of intentions. Lastly, Levy concludes that while there are 
methodological problems in introducing misperception in conflict theory, they are 
essential in understanding theoretical causes of war.
29
 
While the individual level of analysis provides a better understanding for how a 
leader can make decisions, there are many factors for which it cannot account for. As 
some critics have previously stated, one cannot rely on the individual level of analysis 
only to analyze policy decisions because it cannot explain how different leaders, in 
similar settings, will react similarly.
30
 It also cannot account for the limitations placed on 
the individuals such as their own political affiliations, role of political advisors, and the 
role of public opinion. Therefore, we must look to a more complete explanation of 
policy influences, turning our focus now to the domestic and systemic levels of analysis.  
2.3: State Level of Analysis 
 While individuals represent the human agents of foreign policy decision making, 
the second level of analysis provides more insight into the structure of decision 
making.
31
 The literature on the factors of influence within the state is vast and was 
chosen to better explain what is meant by “domestic” influences. In addition, these 
varying factors of influence help to demonstrate a few things. First, they represent the 
many complexities that exist within the state. In addition, upon examination, it becomes 
evident that many of these domestic factors are linked to one another, and can 
specifically be linked to think tanks, making them essential to the argument presented 
                                                          
29 Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” World 
Politics 36, no. 1 (1983): 76-99. 
30 Maurice A. East et all., 50.  
31 Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008): 10-12.  
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for this thesis. Therefore, this section of the literature review attempts to not only 
highlight some of the domestic factors but also create a link between them and think 
tanks. 
Michael Barnett and Jack Levy’s “Domestic Sources of Alignments and 
Alliances: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73” is an article that addresses the lack of 
significance given to the domestic, social, and political variables that attribute to 
international conflict. The authors examine domestic, political, and economic constraints 
on a state’s ability to mobilize its internal resources and internal threats to the 
government that could result in external alliances. In turn, these alliances can help in 
aiding these domestic threats to the regime.
32
  By using the case study of Egypt, the 
authors find that the argument for domestic sources of alignments and alliances can be 
generalized. While alliances occur and are made at a systemic or international level, “the 
domestic objectives of state actors and the social, economic, and political constraints that 
limit the availability of resources in society and the government's access to those 
resources at acceptable costs must also be considered” because they are essential in 
explaining alliance behavior.
33
 This article is significant because while it highlights 
external events and policy decisions made as a result of external events, it requires us to 
look within the system to understand the policy decisions made, which is what this thesis 
attempts to establish as well. Research institutions, such as the ones studied in this thesis, 
attempt to examine the role of societal, economic, and political constraints placed by 
President Obama that result in his policy outputs towards Iran. Therefore, when studying 
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the foreign policy towards Iran, we cannot ignore the limitations and expectations placed 
on a decision maker that result from the complexities within the state system. 
Even though the research conducted for this thesis examines the role of the 
President of the United States as the Chief Executive and the impact of domestic 
influences on him, the role of the United States Congress cannot be ignored. Since the 
United States operates on a system of checks and balances, which allows each of the 
three branches of the government a significant role in decision making, it is necessary to 
examine the role of the legislative branch. Some foreign policy experts place much 
emphasis on the role of the United States Congress as a domestic influence on foreign 
policy. James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, in their article “Foreign and Defense Policy 
in Congress: A Research Agenda for the 1990s,” examine ways in which the role of 
Congress can be better understood and appreciated in regards to foreign policy decision 
making. The authors call for research that seeks to understand, explain, and hopefully 
predict the foreign policy behavior of Congress conducted through normative 
questions.
34
 Lindsay and Ripley then examine the influence of public opinion, 
constituencies, the Congressional agenda, interest groups, partisanship, defense 
committees, and several others on Congress’ foreign policy decision making. The 
authors conclude that studying the role of Congress is essential in advancing the 
understanding of policy and politics as well as addressing issues that are of vital 
importance to the country.
35
 
Lindsay and Ripley are not alone in examining the role of Congress in foreign 
policy decision making. Glenn Hastedt, Laura Neack, Valerie Hudson, and Christopher 
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Hill all make mention of the importance of Congress as well as other domestic factors in 
influencing foreign policy outputs. Glenn Hastedt, in American Foreign Policy: Past, 
Present, and Future, presents many of the domestic factors that contribute to the foreign 
policy decision making process. He examines the role of leaders, the media, public 
opinion, elections, interest groups, and Congress. Hastedt also gives a detailed 
description of the foreign affairs bureaucracy and the important role it plays in foreign 
policy decisions.  
 Laura Neack, in her book, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a 
Globalized World, discusses “national self-image” and explains how different 
stereotypes in “in-nations” are culturally shared and perpetuated. As a result, siege 
mentality can dominate. This occurs when members of a group hold a central belief that 
the rest of the world has negative behavioral intentions towards them.
36
 Neack examines 
many aspects of the domestic factors that shape foreign policy. In addition to structure, 
she also discusses the importance of the leader as well as the government type. In her 
explanation of foreign policy as a dual-nested game, she identifies two frameworks that 
help explain the domestic political games and policy choices. The first framework, 
established by Hagan, is called “Accommodate, Insulate, and Mobilize.” The second 
framework is “Democratization and War,” and unlike Democratic Peace Theory, this 
framework explains how the process of democratization will lead to “societal change, 
institutional weakness, and threatened interests.” In order to ensure stability, democratic 
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norms and institutions must be consolidated together and this must be done without 
war.
37
 
 Valerie Hudson explains that foreign policy is simply a continuation of domestic 
policy by using diversity of viewpoint and equal distribution of power as examples of 
similarities between domestic and foreign policy. She uses nature of the regime as well 
as political institutions to show how foreign policy can be either directly or indirectly 
affected. In addition, Hudson explains that there are many actors in politics that have an 
effect on foreign policy ranging from the different branches of the United States 
government, to the media, to interest groups, to epistemic communities.
38
  
 In a similar regard, Christopher Hill argues that “no one now believes that 
foreign policy is unaffected by what occurs within states. The billiard ball metaphor has 
been discarded, together with the notion that foreign policy is essentially a problem of 
strategy like chess.”39 In close agreement with Laura Neack and Valerie Hudson, Hill 
also assumes that foreign policy “is made and conducted in complex domestic and 
international environments,” or that foreign policy is a “dual-nested game” and decision 
making is “multifactorial” and “multilevel.”40 Hill also cites the importance of the 
foreign affairs bureaucracy by examining the functions of the ministry of foreign affairs, 
challenges to diplomatic services, and the theory of bureaucratic politics.
41
 Hill claims 
that the bureaucratic politics approach, first introduced by Graham T. Allison, has two 
general consequences for the studying of foreign policy: “it reinforces the whole 
domestic politics approach, against the skepticism of realism, neo-realism and some 
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forms of historicism, and it presents a picture of decision-making in which ‘foul-ups,’ as 
opposed to either rationality or inevitability, are very prominent.”42 
 Hill and many other international affairs and foreign policy scholars incorporate 
the work of Graham T. Allison into their work when studying internal factors of foreign 
policy decision making. Allison creates three different models for policy making and 
tests these models by using the Cuban missile crisis as a case study. The first model, the 
Rational Policy Model, is based on the realist notion that the government will take on the 
role of unitary decision maker in order to find the most pragmatic and rational course of 
action to fulfill its security goals. The second model, the Organizational Process Model, 
shows that foreign policy decisions are not rational decisions, but that they stem from 
outputs of organizational processes. Essentially, Allison is arguing that policy options 
are already part of standard operating procedures (SOPs). The third model which many 
scholars cite as key in understanding the domestic actions and behaviors to influence 
foreign policy is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. Allison describes this model as a 
positioning game, meaning that politically positioned leaders and organizations are the 
key players in creating foreign policy. As such, each leader and/or representative will 
have his/her own positions based on the organization/bureaucracy he/she represents. 
Therefore, foreign policy is a bargaining game based on bureaucratic positioning and 
policy outputs are a result of negotiations among leaders.
43
  
 While Allison’s bureaucratic model is innovative as well as essential to 
understanding the impact of bureaucracies, it is important to note that many other 
scholars have built on this argument. Henry Kissinger, in “Domestic Structure and 
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Foreign Policy,” explains the relationship between relatively stable domestic structures 
and adventurous foreign policy. According to Kissinger, the more stable the domestic 
structures are, the less likely the decision maker is to make risky decisions. He examines 
both the impact of administrative structure and the nature of leadership on foreign policy 
explaining that bureaucracies can take on an agenda of their own and leaders can drown 
in standard operation procedures (SOPs). However, bureaucracies are essential to 
nations because elementary knowledge is needed for judgment, and without a 
bureaucracy, this is not possible. An important point Kissinger makes is that domestic 
structures do not exist in a vacuum, meaning they respond to the requirements of the 
environment.
44
 
 What do Hastedt, Neack, Hudson, Hill, Allison, and Kissinger all have in 
common? Other than adding extensive research to the study of foreign policy, they also 
provide several elements that are present at a domestic level that are important for 
studying think tanks. Hastedt, for example, analyzes the public opinion and the media, 
both of which are key to formulating policy in think tanks. Neack and Hudson both 
touch on norms such as democratic ideals found in a democratic government that can 
impact policy formation. It is important to understand the different elements of 
democracy including the protection of human rights and the quest for security because 
they are also found in the policy research and advice conducted by research institutions. 
In the collection samples used for this thesis, some publications done by think tanks use 
democratic ideals such as protection of human rights to place pressure on policy makers, 
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making pressure to uphold democratic ideals a means of influence for think tank 
analysts.  
In addition to public opinion, the media, and democratic norms, Hill, Allison, and 
Kissinger all discuss the impact of structure on foreign policy decision making. 
Structure, in their articles, refer to the bureaucratic constraints, standard operating 
procedures, administrative agendas, and organizational outputs because they create a 
situation in which decision makers are limited by their positions within organizations, 
bureaucracies, and so on. These arguments are also important to analyze in light of think 
tanks because not only do research analysts take into consideration the bureaucratic 
constraints on a decision maker, but they themselves are also subject to administrative 
constraints and standard operation procedures. Therefore, it is important to build on 
these arguments for the purpose of this literature review.  
Daniel Drezner, in his article titled “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting 
of Foreign Policy,” also examines the role of the bureaucracy in foreign policy decision 
making in regards to how the bureaucracy influences institutions. Drezner seeks to fill 
the gaps in Allison’s argument by suggesting “the origins of bureaucratic preferences, 
strategies to maximize organizational utility and likely outcomes. In particular, the 
ability of bureaucracies to use organizational culture as a means of propagating ideas is 
crucial to determining outcomes.”45 He does so by examining the placement and ability 
to create ideas by both insulated agencies and embedded agencies. Drezner concludes 
that “insulated agencies can create organizational cultures wedded to their founding 
ideas [and that] this makes insulated agencies robust to challenges from other 
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organizations and increases the odds of survival.”46 In addition, “embedded agencies are 
constrained from crafting a separate organizational culture, making them more 
vulnerable to manipulation by the larger bureaucracy. If they do survive, however, they 
are more likely to thrive.”47 
 Steven B. Redd also examines agents within the bureaucracy—in particular, the 
role of the advisers in influencing foreign policy. Redd uses the poliheuristic theory of 
foreign policy decision making to test the effects of the presence of advisers on strategy 
selection and choice as well as influence.
48
 Redd finds that decision makers are highly 
sensitive to and aware of the consequences of their actions and decisions, political or 
otherwise. He also discovers that political advisers act as “a sensitizing mechanism for 
decision makers, which led them to adopt noncompensatory decision rules.”49 In 
poliheuristic theory, a noncompensatory decision is one which a decision maker is not 
willing to compromise on—i.e. a nonnegotiable term which the decision maker renders 
as most important to him/her. As such, when decision makers employ noncompensatory 
strategies, the role of the political adviser becomes essential because the adviser helps 
the decision maker decide on what the nonnegotiable terms are.
50
 
 As previously discussed, the impact of citizens and public opinion are important 
aspects to consider when examining decision making on a state level of analysis. 
Sowmya Anand and Jon Krosnick examine the impact of attitudes towards foreign 
policy goals and public preferences among the 2000 presidential candidates. The authors 
discover that citizens evaluate foreign policy goals and these goals have a direct impact 
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on the candidates, and this results in candidates taking distinct stands on certain foreign 
policy issues.
51
 
 Bartholomew Sparrow and Shibley Telhami also pay attention to the role of 
public opinion and foreign policy decisions. Sparrow, in his article, “Who Speaks for the 
People? The President, the Press, and Public Opinion in the United States,” unpacks the 
relationship between the president, the press, and public opinion in order to better 
understand who speaks for the people and “determine under which conditions each 
institution speaks for the public and under which it dominates or is subordinate to the 
others.”52 Telhami’s argument builds on Sparrow’s in that he sheds light on the 
importance of public opinion when making policy decisions, especially when studying 
the Middle East.
53
 
 Lastly, it is important to examine the role of interest groups and lobbies because 
they are another significant factor in foreign policy making in the United States.  David 
Lowery, author of “Why Do Organized Interests Lobby?: A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context 
Theory of Lobbying,” examine the role of interest groups and lobbies in democratic 
societies and seeks to understand what results in group mobilization. In his article, 
Lowery begins by examining a broad variety of interest groups and proposes four 
theories for why interest groups lobby. The first theory is a derivation of profit 
maximization theory which argues that interest groups will attempt to maximize their 
gains. The second theory states that lobby groups go into battle with one another, even 
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against all odds. The third theory argues that lobby groups behave non-rationally when 
they compete against each other for policy changes. The last theory states that organized 
interests lobby due to the complexity of the influence process that occurs within the 
interest group.
54
 While Lowery acknowledges the validity of such arguments, he 
proposes that they are not sufficient in explaining why organized interests lobby. He 
proposes a theoretical framework which uses Niche Theory and Resource Dependency 
Theory to help fill the gap in understanding lobby groups. While both of these theories 
are primarily used in the field of biology, Lowery uses them in socio-cultural manner to 
come to the conclusion that interest groups lobby first and foremost for their survival 
rather than influencing policy. By understanding organizational behavior, Lowery is able 
to create an abstract model that can take into account the many complexities of 
successful lobbying.
55
  
Lowery’s argument that interest groups lobby for survival can be seen in many 
cases. One example of lobbying for survival can be seen in John Mearsheimer and 
Steven Walt’s essay, “The Israel Lobby,” which argues that no special interest group in 
the United States has the ability to make such an impact on foreign policy decisions like 
the Israel Lobby. Mearsheimer and Walt dissect how the Lobby has managed to 
convince Americans that United States’ interests and those of Israel are essentially 
identical.
56
 This is significant to this study because lobby groups have the ability to 
directly influence policy makers, especially if they are well organized and funded. Walt 
and Mearsheimer argue that Israel has been the determining force of U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East. Furthermore, they argue that the “rogue states” of the Middle East, 
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such as Iran for example, are not so much a threat to the United States as they are an 
immediate threat to Israel. For this reason, the Israeli Lobby appeals to policy makers to 
support its interests in the Middle East which include the protection of Israel as the only 
democratic state in the region, as well as financial and ideological support.
57
 Lobbyists 
not only appeal to decision makers but also to other domestic factors of influence 
including research institutions. In the data gathered for this thesis, several articles are 
present highlighting not only the role of the United States towards Iran, but also the role 
of the United States and Israel with regards to Iran, driving home Walt and 
Mearsheimer’s argument that “U.S. policy in the region derives almost entirely from 
domestic politics.”58 
 Robert Trice also argues the importance of both interest groups and mass public 
opinion as having an influence on foreign policy. Trice argues that interest groups have 
no “formal policy-making authority, and must rely on those people within the 
government who do have such authority to translate their policy preferences into 
decisional outputs.”59 Therefore, the interest groups first must investigate when 
decisions are to be made and secondly create an appropriate lobbying strategy. Trice 
empirically examines the relationship between public opinion and interest groups and 
concludes that in order to be more effective, interest groups must rely on other resources 
to influence policy makers in addition to public opinion
60
 
 Charles McC. Mathias discusses the role of ethnic groups and lobbying in the 
United States but is critical of the role of ethnic groups. McC. Mathias draws a 
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distinction between ethnicity which he says “enriches American life and culture, and 
organized ethnic interest groups, which sometimes press causes that derogate from the 
national interest.”61 The author concludes that the strength of ethnic groups and lobbyists 
lies in their “ability to galvanize for specific political objectives the strong emotional 
bonds of large numbers of Americans to their cultural or ancestral homes [and that] the 
effects of these emotional bonds on American foreign policy are in some respects 
salutary [because] ethnic groups awaken their fellow citizens to interests and injustices 
that might otherwise be overlooked or sacrificed to more tangible interests.”62 
2.4: Systemic Level of Analysis  
As previously mentioned, Kenneth Waltz, while examining all levels of analysis, 
places an importance on the third image  claiming it offers “a final explanation because 
it does not hinge on accidental causes-irrationalities in men, defects in states.”63 In 
addition to the realist and balance-of-power theorists, other scholars also examine the 
importance of the international system. For example, Thomas Mowle, in “Worldviews in 
Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict,” tries to determine what 
theory of international relations best fits state behavior. Research was conducted by 
testing conditions under which decision makers view a problem either with a liberalist or 
realist point of view. Mowle analyzes thirty-six foreign conflicts, and the results indicate 
that systemic and situational factors are the most important. Mowle’s research concludes 
that systemic factors are more important than domestic factors and thus, decision makers 
take a realist psychological view when making foreign policy decisions.
64
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 This level of analysis is perhaps the most frequently used amongst scholars since, 
per the previous distinction on the definition of foreign policy, foreign policy is directed 
towards the external world in response to the external world’s actions. While this is true, 
this thesis does not only look at the reaction to external events meaning that while an 
international event might create a shift in policy, it cannot stand alone as an influence on 
foreign policy decisions. This will be further discussed in the upcoming approach 
section. 
2.5: Think Tanks 
 The role of think tanks is “among the most important and least 
appreciated” when it comes to influences on foreign policy.65 According to Richard 
Haass, think tanks affect American foreign policy in five distinct ways: “by generating 
original ideas and opinions for policy, by supplying a ready pool of experts for 
employment in government, by offering venues for high-level discussions, by educating 
U.S. citizens about the world, and by supplementing official efforts to mediate and 
resolve conflict.”66  Think tanks, according to Haass, have evolved out of the need to 
close the gap between ideas and actions, or bridge theory and practice. By tracing the 
rise of think tanks over three waves, the author explains how the third wave focuses on 
both advocacy and research so that think tanks can compete with the marketplace of 
ideas and truly influence policy decisions. While they vary in their location, mandate, 
and funding, policy makers today agree that think thanks offer their greatest impact by 
generating “new thinking” that provides policy makers not only with new questions but 
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also new solutions and perspectives.
67
 It is this impact that this thesis attempts to draw 
attention to. In order to have an impact, think tanks “need to exploit multiple channels 
and marketing strategies—publishing articles, books, and occasional papers; appearing 
regularly on television, op-ed pages, and in newspaper interviews; and producing reader-
friendly issue briefs, fact-sheets, and web pages.”68 In essence, this thesis attempts to 
assess the success of these different marketing strategies. In addition to providing new 
and innovative ideas, think thanks also provide talent to government officials and 
incoming administrations—“brain trust” if you will—because they offer a significant 
amount of experts in the field. For example, former President Jimmy Carter staffed his 
administration with individuals from the Brookings Institution and the Council on 
Foreign Relations, whereas Ronald Reagan turned to Heritage and the American 
Enterprise Institute for policy experts.
69
 While these research institutions provide talent 
to policy makers within the administration, they also serve as an institutional setting for 
departing officials, recreating a “revolving door.”70 This means that while some policy 
makers leave the government service, they are able to become involved in think tanks, 
where they truly can combine practice and theory. Think tanks also provide policy 
makers with different venues in which they can exchange ideas including forums, 
panels, and open debates. In addition to convening professionals and providing policy 
makers with new ideas, think tanks also engage the public by “educating U.S. citizens on 
the nature of the world in which they live.
71
 Finally, think tanks impact foreign policy by 
helping bridge differences. This occurs when think tanks sponsor dialogue and third 
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party mediation, helping to facilitate “Track II” diplomacy. While this is an unofficial 
undertaking, it is great potential to help build peace and facilitate the reconciliation 
process in conflict-ridden societies.
72
 
Haass is not alone in his assessment of the impact of think tanks on foreign 
policy. Donald Abelson believes that a decentralized system, in addition to funds from 
philanthropic organizations, have resulted in the increase of think tanks in recent years. 
In his article, “Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Historical Perspective,” Abelson 
give a brief history of the rise of American think tanks explaining how many believed 
think tanks originated during World War II as a means of creating space for discussion 
and debate on defense strategies and policies.
73
 However, he traces the role of think 
tanks as evolving over four generations, beginning some time before WWII. The first 
wave of foreign policy think tanks began in the early 1900s and served strictly as 
research institutions and forums for which new ideas could be generated. As Abelson 
cites, think tanks served as “universities without students,” and they were committed to 
addressing many policy issues. The second wave of think tanks arose after WWII as a 
result of the changing international paradigm. As the United States found itself 
becoming a hegemonic power in a bi-polar world, there was a clear need for a new 
defensive strategy, placing policy researchers and analysts at the heart of foreign policy 
to serve as government contractors.
74
 The third wave of think tanks is the advocacy-
oriented think tanks which combine aggressive marketing with policy research and work 
alongside interest groups with whom they share many ideas and beliefs. These think 
tanks were quick to jump at policy debates and sought to specifically influence policy 
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based on their own interests. Finally, the fourth generation of think tanks is what 
Abelson refers to as “legacy-based think tanks,” which were created by former 
presidents as a means to leave their impact on policy.
75
 
Abelson, like Haass, also believes in the influence of think tanks on foreign 
policy. He states that think tanks measure their success by how much influence they 
have in shaping policy. Abelson attempts to assess the amount of influence think tanks 
have, but he is unable to quantify their impact. Rather, he is able to state the following: 
think tanks have an influence, the influence of think tanks depends on how they have 
contributed to certain policy debates and whether their advice has been taken, and lastly, 
by measuring exactly how much impact a think tank has on policy makers, the more 
insight we will have on the exact role of think tanks.
76
  
Strobe Talbott also emphasizes the importance of think tanks stating that “think 
tanks remain a principle source of information and expertise for policy makers and 
journalists.”77 Talbott examines the Brookings Institution, one of the oldest think tanks 
in the United States, as an example of how think tanks work. He traces the role of 
Brookings prior to World War I up to the current day explaining that as the international 
environment shifts, as do the goals and research of research institutions. For example, 
after the terrorist attacks of 9-11, the research conducted by Brookings Institution shifted 
to focus on the relationship between the West and the Islamic world, terrorism, state-to-
state diplomacy, preemptive and preventive warfare, and missile control to name a few.
78
 
The goal of research institutions is to identify the new and important issues that the 
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nation will face, focus on scholarship that will bring these issues to light, provide policy 
research, and then offer proper advice and recommendations.
79
 In order to do so, think 
tanks must utilize all tools at their disposable, such as the tools mentioned by Haass. 
Perhaps, if these tools are properly utilized and policy analysts are able to create 
suggestions for decision makers, policy analysts may truly be able to influence policy 
outcomes.  
 It is not only research scholars such as Haass, Abelson, and Talbott that write on 
the importance of the role of think tanks. Higgot and Stone, in their article, “The Limits 
of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the U.S.,” use think tanks to 
observe the changing agenda in international relations and examine the role of think 
tanks as informers and influencers in the policy process.
80
 The authors argue that “in 
their evolving agendas, foreign policy research institutes are a barometer of change in 
international relations over time…Further, as foreign policy making has become multi-
faceted so too, [they] argue, has the think tank industry.”81 After presenting empirical 
insights into the role of think tanks and asking conceptual questions, the authors 
conclude that the role of think tanks is not only to provide a space for interaction and 
discussion. Rather, successful think tanks have “managed to tap not only the changing 
international agenda…but also the marketing techniques of the era.”82 
 In previous literature, several domestic factors that influence foreign policy were 
examined, both in light of how they influence foreign policy and also how they relate to 
think tanks. Winand Gellner, in his article “The Politics of Policy ‘Political Think 
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Tanks’ and Their Markets in the U.S- Institutional Environment,” examines the process 
by which policy decisions are shaped by think tanks in light of some of these domestic 
influences as well. According to Gellner, the United States is crowded by think tanks, 
which he describes as institutions in the expert market of policy planning and political 
decision making. He argues that in contrast to Western Europe, policy makers in the 
United States are becoming more heavily reliant on expert advice, and as a result, “the 
U.S. market has become a more pluralized field.”83 Gellner concludes that due to an 
increase in demand for answers and advice, think tanks are no longer neutral. Rather, 
think tanks have become more ideological, replaced political parties, and carry out an 
important role in the political system.
84
 This ideological role, which is a result of the 
partisan political influence within the United States and other domestic influences, will 
not only shape the research that think tanks conduct, but also the ways in which they 
influence decision makers. This thesis hopes to better highlight this relationship.  
2.6: Approach 
 As Kenneth Waltz established in Man, the State, and War, all images or levels of 
analysis provide their own benefits and limitations. While Waltz emphasizes the third 
image, the literature review conducted indicates that there are many influential factors 
which impact United States foreign policy. They can occur at the individual, state, or 
systemic level of analysis. When attempting to study U.S. foreign policy decisions, 
either through the first, second, or third level of analysis, one must take into 
consideration all the limitations of each level.  While arguments can be made for each 
level of analysis, this thesis attempts to work within the second level of analysis—the 
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state—in order to better explore the variety of domestic factors of influence as well as 
the relationship between them. Due to the complexity and variety found within the state 
level, this thesis explores domestic factors as part of the “dual-nested game” of foreign 
policy.
85
 
Foreign policy is dual nested in that both domestic and international issues are 
significant to the creation of policy. Therefore, the decision makers make choices that 
reflect not only what is happening externally, but also choices that reflect the current 
situation within the state. As the ultimate decision maker, the President of the United 
States, also referred to as the Chief Executive, must take into account the domestic 
situation in addition to outside factors. For this reason, it is essential that policy analysts 
also take into the consideration domestic factors. Research institutions, or think tanks, 
take these factors into consideration when creating policy papers and making 
suggestions to policy makers. In fact, upon analyzing the work of think tanks, in addition 
to the research in the literature review, it becomes evident that the work of think tanks 
not only reflects the domestic factors of influence on foreign policy, but also that they 
too are subject to domestic influences. This makes think tanks a useful domestic factor to 
investigate because they showcase a variety of domestic influences. For these reasons, 
this thesis  will use to the second level of analysis, and particularly the influence of think 
tanks, to examine United States foreign policy in addition to examining the existing 
relationships between domestic factors of influence. Specifically, research will be 
conducted to view how think tanks have contributed to United States foreign policy 
towards Iran during the Obama Administration. 
 
                                                          
85 Hudson, 5-6. 
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2.7: Executive Orders and Acts 
There are several terms that can be found throughout this thesis, especially in the 
chapter that highlights the policy outputs of the Obama administration through the use of 
executive orders. Before this chapter can be presented, an executive order should be 
defined. In addition, there are acts passed by the United States Congress as well as 
executive orders that have been passed by previous administrations that will be 
mentioned in the chapter on policy outputs. While these acts and executive orders are not 
the focal point of the chapter on policy outputs, they should be defined in order to 
provide a better understanding of the context in which they are used.  
2.7.1: Executive Order 
 This thesis uses executive orders as part of a case study that attempts to link 
policy research to policy outputs in which executive orders are the means of measuring 
policy outputs. Executive orders are defined by the Encyclopedia of the American 
Constitution as “a class of presidential documents that primarily regulate actions of 
government officials and agencies.”86 Executive orders can be issued under specific 
legal authorization or under the President’s own authority under Article II of the United 
States Constitution. Since executive orders are made by the Chief Executive solely, they 
will be used as a means to measure the policy outputs of President Barack Obama.  
2.7.2: Executive Order 12957  
 In March of 1995, President William Clinton issued Executive Order 12957 titled 
“Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum 
Resources” as result of “the actions and policies of the Government of Iran [which] 
                                                          
86 Leonard Levy et all., Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1986), 669.  
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constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States.”87 In this order, President Clinton prohibits the 
entrance of any United States citizen into any petroleum corporations in Iran or tied to 
Iran. In addition, it also prohibits any transactions by a United States citizen that evades 
the prohibitions established in this executive order.
88
 
2.7.3: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
 Passed in 1996 by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and later 
signed by the President, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 places sanctions “on 
persons making certain investments directly and significantly contributing to the 
enhancement of the ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on 
persons exporting certain items that enhance Libya’s weapons or aviation capabilities or 
enhance Libya’s ability to develop its petroleum resources, and for other purposes.”89 In 
addition to the restrictions the U.S. places on Iran, this act also encourages the President 
to participate in diplomatic relations with other countries in order to establish 
multilateral trade sanctions against Iran. By doing so, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 
of 1996 attempts to reduce Iran’s development of petroleum resources and also attempts 
to end Iran’s ability to support international acts of terrorism.90 This act also states the 
specific circumstances in which the President may choose to lift the sanctions in addition 
to placing a minimum duration of two years for the sanctions.
91
 
 
 
                                                          
87 William J. Clinton, “Presidential Documents: Executive Order 12957,” Federal Registrar 50, no. 52 (1995): 14615. 
88 Ibid, 14616.  
89 104th Congress, H.R. 3107 (104th): Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), 1.  
90 Ibid, 2-3.  
91 Ibid, 8-10.  
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2.7.4: Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
 In 2010, Congress passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act which amends the sanctions place on Iran by the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996.
92
 This act expresses that further sanctions are indeed necessary 
due to Iran’s increasing nuclear efforts as highlighted by the failure of Iran to disclose 
the full nature of its nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).
93
 In addition, the Act also calls for the President to take action towards the 
severe human rights violations committed by Iran. Section 103 imposes three (3) more 
sanctions in addition to what was established in 1996 which include prohibition of any 
imports into the United States, prohibition of any exports to Iran, and freezing of assets 
of certain individuals and officials. This act also urges the President to impose sanctions 
on the Central Bank of Iran and any other financial institution that support terrorist 
groups or proliferation activities as well as submit a list to Congress on officials 
violating human rights in Iran.
94
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93 111th Congress,  H.R. 2194 (111th): Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Perhaps the most important and difficult aspect of a thesis is establishing a 
research methodology which best fits the research questions asked. This thesis seeks to 
establish a link between foreign policy research institutions and foreign policy outputs, 
and in essence argues that despite how difficult it may be to measure, there is a certain 
level of impact which research institutions have on United States foreign policy decision 
makers. Furthermore, it can be said that the null hypothesis of this thesis would be that 
research institutions have no impact whatsoever on foreign policy decision makers and 
that the institutions themselves are also not impacted by other domestic factors of 
influence.  
3.1: Research Framework 
 In order to test the validity of this research question, a framework will be created 
which best serves the methodology used to answer the question posed. Therefore, this 
thesis will use a case study of the administration of President Barack Obama and the 
policy outputs of President Obama towards the country of Iran. In order to provide 
ground work for this case study, a few steps must be established. First, as the literature 
review indicated, foreign affairs specialists are bombarded with a variety of influences 
on a daily basis; as such, it is important to filter out which influences and/or domestic 
factors have the most impact on foreign policy decision makers—i.e. which factors are 
more important than others. The literature review provides not only a level of analysis in 
which foreign policy is to be analyzed, but it also indicates that research institutions, e.g. 
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think tanks, serve not only as a domestic factor in foreign policy decision making, but 
that they also are linked to many other domestic factors. In part, this thesis seeks to 
establish just how significant this link is and to what extent think tanks contribute to 
foreign policy decision making in the United States. The first step in doing so was 
examining pre-existing literature and establishing a deeper understanding of all aspects 
involved in foreign policy decision making.  
 Having established a thorough literature review, the following step is to create a 
means in which this case study can be tested. This will be done by conducting a reverse 
analysis of foreign policy decisions, meaning this thesis will first examine the policy 
outputs of the Obama administration followed by the possible policy influences referred 
to as “collection samples.” In the literature review, both Steven Walt and David Baldwin 
criticize the current inconsistencies and gaps between research and policy outputs. The 
thesis attempts to work within the existing frameworks to help bridge said gaps by 
linking outputs to policy influences.  
3.1.1: Establishing Policy Outputs  
 There can be many means in which to examine the policy outputs of an 
administration because within the administration, there are several different decision 
makers. Rather than look at the statements and actions of all the different decision 
makers in the Obama administration, this research only examines the policy outputs of 
President Barack Obama. It does so by examining the executive orders issued during his 
presidency that are foreign policy decisions towards Iran. Perhaps a question that arises 
here is why use executive orders as a means to measure foreign policy output? The logic 
is two –fold. First, because there will be a multitude of variables in establishing policy 
influences, it is important that there be consistency and control in measuring policy 
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outputs. Therefore, the foreign policy actions of the Chief Executive provide a control in 
that they represent the decisions made by the administration in a simple and concise 
manner. Second, a presidential administration is filled with foreign policy decision 
makers, each having their own expertise and each making foreign policy decisions which 
affect the United States daily. The problem then is how one can measure all the foreign 
policy decisions made by all the members of the administration with regards to Iran. The 
reality is that this would be a very difficult and daunting task, not to mention that some 
decision and/or statements made regarding foreign policy may not actually be turned 
into policy. This means that just because a member of Obama’s administration makes a 
policy decision, it does not mean that this decision will be upheld and/or adopted by the 
Chief Executive. Therefore, executive orders were chosen as means to measure policy 
output because they generally occur as a result of many individual policy statements 
and/or decisions within the administration, they are carried out solely by the Chief 
Executive, and they are issued either under legal authorization or the President’s own 
authorization and as such, they regulate the actions of government official and agencies. 
Chapter four will be dedicated to examining the policy outputs of President Barack 
Obama by means of executive orders. 
3.1.2: Creating “Collection Samples” 
 Having established policy outputs, this research then attempts to create an 
example of policy influences using research institutions. Once again, there are many 
ways in which this can be done, some perhaps simpler and more concise than others. For 
example, one may argue that comparing a policy research paper from each institution to 
policy outputs may be one way to measure impact. However, based on the literature 
review conducted, this would seem lacking because as previously established, think 
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tanks not only provide policy makers with policy papers, but also they offer individual 
expertise, a marketplace of new ideas, and many forums in which debate can occur. The 
question then becomes how can all of this be measured? Rather than isolating one aspect 
of the type of research conducted by think tanks, this thesis will create “collection 
samples” from four well known think tanks as a means to examine factors of influence 
on foreign policy.  
 Four research institutions were chosen for this case study and will be used to 
create collection samples. They are the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings 
Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for American Progress. 
These think tanks were chosen based on two requisites. First, they are well known, 
respected, and extremely visible in the field of policy research, making them some of the 
most utilized policy research institutions in the United States. Secondly, these four think 
tanks, while all identifying as nonpartisan, lie on a different place on the conservative-
liberal, Republican-Democrat spectrum. The United States is dominated by two major 
political parties, the Republican Party (right) and Democrat Party (left), and the research 
institutions chosen each fall somewhere within these two parties. The Council on 
Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution both lie somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum, with the Council on Foreign Relations falling slightly center-right and the 
Brookings Institution falling slightly center-left. The other two institutions are more 
easily identifiable. The American Enterprise Institute falls to the right of the spectrum, 
whereas the Center for American Progress falls to the left of the spectrum. Because of 
their diversity, these four think tanks represent a picture of the different political 
affiliations within Washington, DC. 
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 Each collection sample will be created by researching each individual think tank 
as well as an in-depth search through the archives of the think tanks. From the archives, 
the collection will be formed using a variety of material including editorials, op-eds, 
policy papers, articles, debates, symposium transcripts, opinion polls, roundtable 
discussions, and guest lectures. These collection samples will be beneficial for several 
reasons. First, they allow for more variables to be included as factors of influence on 
foreign policy. This provides for a more realistic representation of actual real life policy 
influences. Second, they provide a more holistic and inclusive representation of each 
research institution. By limiting the samples to one or two types of material only takes 
into account a few different scholars. However, the purpose of this research is to provide 
a complete picture of different types of work done by think tanks and the extent to which 
they are influential. Lastly, diverse collection samples help to better bridge the gap 
between research and policy because they offer more insight into the complexities of 
policy making as well as the interconnectedness of policy research found within 
Washington, DC.  
 Once the material is gathered for the collection samples, it will be divided into 
three time periods within each think tank: prior to 2009, 2009 to 2010, and 2011 to 
present. The first time period, while it falls prior to the Obama administration, is 
necessary because it helps show which foreign policy challenges will be significant to 
the incoming administration. In addition, this section will be used to highlight that 
foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum or single time frame. Rather, foreign policy 
develops on a continuum and that while administrations may vary drastically in 
partisanship, the foreign policies of said administrations may be more similar than one 
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may think.  The second and third time frames were used because they are a logical 
midway division for Obama’s four year term. 
3.1.3: Analysis, Measuring Influence 
 Once both the policy outputs and the collection samples have been established 
and created, they will be analyzed with regards to one another. In order to measure 
whether or not research influences policy, this thesis will attempt to link similarities 
between the policy research presented in the collection samples to the actual policy 
outputs of the Obama administration. Each think tank will be analyzed individually with 
regard to policy outputs in two categories. First, how accurate was the think tank in 
predicting changes or shifts in foreign policy and foreign policy challenges? Are there 
any similarities between the research conducted by the think tanks and the executive 
orders? If so, what themes appear in the collection samples taken from the think tanks 
and how do they manifest as factors of influence on foreign policy within the executive 
orders? The second category looks at the variety of influences within the think tanks. 
What does this reveal about think tanks themselves? Can they be considered the most 
influential domestic factors of influence on foreign policy? By using these two 
categories as a means of analysis, this thesis will attempt to identify a link between 
research institutions and policy decisions. 
3.2: Research Challenges and Limitations 
 As with any research, this thesis is not without its own challenges and 
limitations. It would be ideal for this research to be conducted in a pre-existing statistical 
framework to measure exact levels of impact of research institutions on foreign policy 
decision makes. Since no such framework exists, it was a challenge to find an exact 
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means of measuring influence, so rather than a quantitative method of measurement, this 
thesis relies on assumptions made based on existing similarities.  
 Deciding on the selection for each collection sample proved to be a challenge 
because of the vast amount of literature that is available. Initially, I was going to 
compare one or two policy papers from each think tank rather than create a collection 
sample. However, even though there are many policy papers in the think tank archives, 
they do not occur around the same time. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to use them as 
a control in this research. In addition, there is no equal amount of material available from 
each archive; therefore the size of each collection sample varies. Once again, this is due 
to the large variety of material that was available as well as the significance of the 
material to this case study. Some collection samples rely more heavily on internal policy 
papers, while others use outside research and opinions of policy scholars.  One cannot 
say that one is more important than the other; therefore, one cannot create equal size 
collection samples.  
 Lastly, while this thesis examines policy influences from a domestic level of 
analysis, it does not attempt to negate the role of an individual leader or a sudden event 
or crisis in the international environment. However, it does attempt to show that 
domestic levels of influence, specifically think tanks, are significant to policy decisions. 
By making this statement, this thesis devotes the bulk of the research to domestic factors 
only. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLICY OUTPUTS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
 In the case study presented, executive orders are used as a means of identifying 
policy outputs. These executive orders have been issued by President Barack Obama 
during his administration, from the year 2009 until present day. 
95
 They were obtained 
from archives through the White House, and they address the changes made with respect 
to United States foreign policy towards Iran. All of these executive orders were taken “in 
response actions of the Government of Iran occurring after the conclusion of the 1981 
Algiers Accords, and are intended solely as a response to those later actions.”96 
4.1: Executive Order 13553 
 Executive Order 13553, “Designating Iranian Officials Responsible for or 
Complicit in Serious Human Rights Abuses,” was issued by President Barack Obama on 
September 29, 2010 under presidential authority granted by the Constitution, the 
National Emergencies Act, and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010 in order to take additional steps with respect to Executive Order 
12957. This order blocks the property of certain individuals (listed in the annex of the 
order) with respect to serious human rights violations by the government of Iran. 
97
 
 Section One blocks all property and interests in property that are in the United 
States or come within the United States of the people listed in the Annex of the order and 
any person deemed by the Secretary of Treasury to be: a) an official of the Government 
                                                          
95 Note: For the purpose of this research, the last executive order used was issued February 6, 2012. Any executive 
orders regarding Iran after 02/06/2012 were not used.  
96 Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order 13553: Designating Iranian Officials Responsible 
for or Complicit in Serious Human Rights Abuses, 29 September 2010.**Found in all Executive Orders. 
97 Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order 13553: Designating Iranian Officials Responsible 
for or Complicit in Serious Human Rights Abuses, 29 September 2010.  
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of Iran or a person action on behalf of the Government of Iran who is guilty of ordering, 
controlling, or participating in serious human rights abuses against Iranian civilians on or 
after June 12, 2009, b) a person having provided any support or assistance to the 
aforementioned persons in (a), or c) a person who is owned by or acts in support of or in 
behalf of any person blocked by this order. In addition, any donations made to any 
person blocked by this order is prohibited including but not limited to provision of funds, 
goods, or services provided to blocked persons. 
98
 
 Section Two places restrictions on United States citizens and states that any 
transaction that is made by a United States citizen that would in any way jeopardize this 
order is prohibited as is any conspiracy to violate this order. Section Four allows the 
measures taken in this order to happen without prior warning. Sections Five, Six, Seven, 
Eight, and Nine give more authority to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of 
State authorizing them to take actions necessary to carry out this order, allowing them to 
imposing visa sanctions (with consultation of the Secretary of Homeland Security), and 
requesting updated lists of persons subject to this order.
99
 
4.2: Executive Order 13574 
 Executive Order 13574, “Concerning Further Sanctions on Iran,” was issued by 
President Barack Obama on May 23, 2011 under presidential authority granted by the 
Constitution, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National 
Emergencies Act, the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, and the Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.  
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 Section One explains sanctions already put in place by the Iran Sanctions Act 
(ISA) of 1996 including prohibition of loans from United States financial institutions, 
prohibition of foreign exchange, transfer of credits, or payments, the blocking of all 
United States property or interests that come in possession or control of an ISA 
sanctioned person, and the restriction and prohibition of goods by any sanctioned person. 
The order adds to these sanctions and prohibits any donations that would benefit any 
ISA sanctioned person including but not limited to the donation of funds, goods, or 
services. Once again, Section Two places restrictions on United States citizens and states 
that any transaction that is made by a United States citizen that would in any way 
jeopardize this order is prohibited as is any conspiracy to violate this order. Section Four 
also allows the measures taken in this order to happen without prior warning. Finally, 
Section Five gives the authority to the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State 
as well as all agencies of the United States Government to carry out all purposes of this 
order.
100
 
4.3: Executive Order 13590 
 Executive Order 13590, “Iran Sanctions,” was issued by President Barack 
Obama on November 21, 2011 under presidential authority granted by the Constitution, 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and 
Executive Order 12957. This new round of sanctions includes more stringent guidelines 
as well as gives more authority to the different agencies and officials in the United States 
government.  
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 Section One allow the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of 
Commerce, United States Trade Representative, the President of the Export-Import 
Bank, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to 
impose sanctions on an persons who: a) sells, leases, or provides goods, services, 
technology, or support to Iran over fair market value of $1,000,000.00 that could 
contribute to Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources located in Iran or b) sells, 
leases, or provides goods, services, technology, or support to Iran over fair market value 
of $250,000.00 that could contribute to Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources 
located in Iran. Other people possibly affiliated with (a) and (b) such as a successor, or 
any person that owns or controls a person and has knowledge of illicit actions which 
undermine these sanctions are also subject to sanctions.
101
 
 Section Two gives authority to the Secretary of State to implement sanctions on 
persons found guilty of the actions in Section One. Heads of relevant agencies must 
work with the Secretary of State in order to implement these sanctions. For example, the 
Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank shall deny approval of the issuance of any 
guarantee in connection with the exportation of any goods to a sanctioned person. In 
addition, agencies are not to enter into a contract with or procure any goods or services 
from a sanctioned person nor are they allowed to issue any specific license or permission 
to export or reexport goods by a sanctioned person without the approve of the United 
State government. If the “sanctioned person” is a financial institution, the Chairman of 
the Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System can deny designation of the 
institution as a dealer in the United States government.
102
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 Section Three allows the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, to prohibit any US financial institution from making loans or credits 
to a sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000.00, prohibit transactions in 
foreign exchange, prohibit any transfers of credits, block all property that are in the 
United States, and restrict or prohibit goods, technology, and services into the US from a 
sanctioned person. As in previous executive orders, prohibitions include the contribution 
of funds, goods, or services. Once again, if any American citizen attempts to evade or 
conspire against these sanctions, he/she will also be sanctioned. Finally, Section Seven 
gives authority to the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State as well as all 
agencies of the United States Government to carry out all purposes of the order.
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4.4: Executive Order, February 2012 
 On February 6, 2012, President Barack Obama issued an executive order titled, 
“Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions,” under 
the presidential authority granted by the Constitution, the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, and the National Emergencies Act. This executive order is meant 
to build on Executive Order 12957. It is in response to the deceptive practices by the 
Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks that are attempting to conceal transactions 
with previously sanctioned parties.
104
 
 Section One states that the property of the Government of Iran, including the 
Central Bank of Iran, that are within the United States are blocked and may not be 
transferred, paid, exported, or withdrawn. This also applies to any Iranian financial 
institution and any person or institution that acts on behalf of already blocked persons or 
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Iranian Financial Institutions, 6 February 2012.  
 48 
 
provides donations to said blocked persons. Section Two and Three outline the 
prohibitions that are included in this order including provision of funds, goods, and 
services which would aid any person whose property has been blocked. As with other 
executive orders, any American citizen attempting to evade or conspire against these 
prohibitions is also prohibited. Section Eight allows these measures to occur without 
prior warning. Lastly, Sections Eight through Eleven give authority to the Secretary of 
State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National 
Intelligence to exercise the proper functions necessary as described in the order.
105
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLICY INFLUENCES, RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
 This portion of the thesis is devoted to collecting data from four different 
research institutions that currently promote policy research. The data collected from each 
institution is a collection of articles, policy research publications, op-eds, polls, 
interviews, roundtable discussions, debates, conference transcripts, and editorials. The 
research collected from each institution will make up a collection sample from that 
institution and will be later analyzed with respect to policy outputs and content. 
5.1: United States/Iran Relations 
 In order to understand the context of the policy recommendations made by 
scholars from the four research institutions, some background on the political situation in 
Iran must be explained. The policy suggestions in the collection samples reflect the 
political environment in Iran as well as the relations between Iran and the United States 
during the selected time periods. 
5.1.1: Prior to 2009 
 Prior to the Obama administration, the relationship between Iran and the United 
States was tense and hostile. The relationship further deteriorated when former President 
George W. Bush labeled Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, an “axis of evil” due to 
their development of long-range missiles. This resulted in outrage in Iran, especially 
from reformists and conservatives.
106
 In November of 2003, Iran claimed it had 
suspended its uranium enrichment program and would allow inspections by the United 
Nations and the IAEA. However, by the fall of 2005, Iran has resumed uranium 
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conversion and was found in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the IAEA.
107
 
In addition, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hard line conservative, was elected President of 
Iran in 2005 resulting in more hostility from Tehran towards the United States.
108
 
 By 2006, Iran resumed uranium enrichment and by succeeding in doing so, failed 
to suspend their nuclear program as requested by the UN Security Council. In addition to 
nuclear enrichment, by December of 2006, a conference on the Holocaust was held in 
Iran where many delegates denied the existence of the Holocaust.
109
 This resulted in 
outrage and fear in Israel which felt an even greater need to defend its right to exist. By 
2007, the Iranians claimed they had the capability to produce nuclear fuel in massive 
quantities and on an industrial scale. As a result of the growing nuclear capabilities in 
Iran, the United States imposed a new wave of tough sanctions in Iran in 2007.
110
 In 
addition to increased sanctions imposed by the US, the UN Security Council also 
tightened economic and trade sanctions on Iran. By 2008, an incentive package was 
offered to Iran by the Western officials in hopes of deterring Iran’s nuclear activities. 
The UN Security Council also passed a new resolution demanding Iran stop its nuclear 
activities.
111
  
 During his campaign for President of the United States, Barack Obama offered to 
open dialogue with Iran without any preconditions. By November of 2008, Obama was 
elected as President of the United States and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
congratulated the president-elect on his win.
112
 This move was surprising and indicated a 
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possible shift in United States foreign policy towards Iran from one of isolationism to 
one of engagement. 
5.1.2: 2009 through 2010 
 While Ahmadinejad agreed to talks with the United States on the basis of mutual 
respect, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei made a statement in early 2009 that 
President Obama’s policies in the Middle East will be just as misguided as the policies 
of President Bush, especially with regards to the United States’ support of Israel.113 By 
June of 2009, presidential elections occurred in Iran. President Ahmadinejad declared a 
victory despite much speculation of corruption in the election process. The corrupt 
elections resulted in massive demonstrations in Iran which left over thirty people killed 
and thousands arrested.
114
 Throughout 2009, Iran continued uranium enrichment which 
resulted in an offer by the UN for Iran to enrich uranium abroad. This offer was rejected 
by Tehran as Iran refused to end its nuclear program.
115
 Tensions continued to rise in 
2010 as the UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions towards Iran over 
its nuclear program. In addition to the continuation of its nuclear program, Iran 
continued to commit serious human rights violations which resulted in international 
outcry.
116
 
5.1.3: 2011 to Present 
 In February of 2011, Iran sent two warships through the Suez Canal. This 
immediately sparked fear and suspicion, especially from Israel who saw this as an act of 
provocation.
117
 Tensions continued to rise between the United States and Iran as two US 
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citizens are arrested in Iran and found guilty of espionage. In addition, the United States 
government accused Iran of an alleged plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United 
States.
118
 By November of 2011, the IAEA issued a report claiming that Iran was 
attempting to develop a nuclear bomb trigger. This resulted in a response from the 
United States because by January of 2012, the United States imposed a new round of 
sanctions which affected Iran’s central bank. In response, Iran threatened to block the 
Strait of Hormuz which would stop the transport of oil in addition to cripple the 
international economy.
119
 
5.2: Collection Sample One: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
 The Council on Foreign Relations was founded in 1921 as a result of the difficult 
negotiations of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Diplomats decided that Americans 
needed to be better versed in decision making and better understand the responsibilities 
of decision making in foreign affairs. As a result, the Council of Foreign Relations was 
formed to “afford a continuous conference on international questions affecting the 
United States, by bringing together experts on statecraft, finance, industry, education, 
and science.”120  
 Since its inception, the Council on Foreign Relations, abbreviated CFR, has been 
a nonpartisan and noncommercial institution. Its members consist of individuals that are 
able to contribute to discussions and debate with an extensive knowledge in foreign 
affairs. CFR continues to carry out its mission of educating the public on important 
foreign relations issues by hosting discussions and debates, publishing articles, and 
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conducting field research.
121
 Even though debates, guest lectures, and roundtable 
discussions proved to be successful, the founding fathers of CFR were not satisfied so 
they founded Foreign Affairs, a quarterly magazine published by CFR.
122
 Foreign 
Affairs contains editorials, op-eds, research articles, and policy publications by a variety 
of experts in the field. Due to its popularity and contributions to foreign policy research, 
it continues to be a successful and influential publication today. Many of the scholars 
that publish articles and research in Foreign Affairs are scholars and/or members of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and for this reason, the collection sample of the policy 
research created from CFR has been published either through CFR or in Foreign Affairs.  
5.2.1: Prior to 2009 
 The policy research sample for the Council on Foreign Relations begins in 2007 
with an article written by senior fellow Michael A. Levi titled “Got the Sticks. Now the 
Talks” which examines the age old question of when to apply pressure versus when to 
establish communication in foreign relations. Having been written only several months 
after the establishment of a United Nations Resolution which bars Iran from exporting 
arms, this article calls for using the UN Resolution’s success as a means to engage Iran. 
Levi argues that while the United States may not be ready for negotiations, it should not 
rely simply on the real pressure of the resolution—the stick—to disarm Iran. Rather, 
Levi calls for a combination of sanctions and diplomacy—the talks—to “bring around 
Iran.”123 
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 The Council on Foreign Relations’ website hosts many outside publications it 
finds relevant to the field of foreign affairs. In a 2007 publication by the American 
Jewish Committee, Ari Friedman and Maxine Kaye, scholars on human rights, document 
the human rights abuses occurring in Iran. The publication highlights the systemic 
violations of due process that occur in Iran as well as the many cases of torture and the 
astounding amount of trials whose guilty verdict results in capital punishment.
124
 In 
addition to torture and capital punishment, the authors highlight other violations of 
human rights in Iran including the segregation of women, the persecution of religious 
minority groups, censorship of the media, the cruelty towards children, and the 
punishment of homosexuals by death. The American Jewish Committee calls for a 
breaking the silence and speaking up against these human rights about by calling for 
international condemnation.
125
 
 Lionel Beehner, senior fellow at CFR, in his article “Iran Inches Toward Nuclear 
Red Line,” explains the three major perspectives of different CFR scholars towards the 
crisis with Iran. Some, such as Max Boot, justify attacking Iran militarily before it 
acquires nuclear weapons. Other scholars, such as Seymour Hersh echo this sentiment 
stating that the United States has clandestine plans to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. 
There are also scholars that seek tighter sanctions—i.e. “squeezing Iran financially”—as 
a means to solving the crisis with Iran. Lastly, Beehner states that there are some 
scholars who do not support military action nor sanction, but rather active 
engagement.
126
 In another article Beehner emphasizes the role of the Iranian civil society 
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and states that some scholars believe that lifting U.S. sanctions on Iran will result in 
more open dialogue and a more powerful Iranian civil society.
127
  
 In a discussion hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Levi and 
Graham Allison discuss the question: How likely is a nuclear terrorist attack on the 
United States? In the discussion, both scholars debate the probability of a nuclear attack, 
and while they disagree upon the magnitude and the timing, they both agree that the 
possibility of an attack is real and that what is needed is thinking through what factors 
may result in a nuclear terrorist attack and what means are needed to prevent these 
factors.
128
 
 Ray Takeyh, former US Department of State official, suggests that the actions of 
the Bush Administration will not succeed because threatening Tehran will not work; 
rather, what is needed is a realistic understanding of Iranian politics. In his article, 
Takeyh explains that conservatives within Iran are not likely to participate in discussions 
with the U.S. or want to have anything to do with a rapprochement. He argues that the 
direct talks are not likely to occur, and rather than continuing to threating Iran, the 
United States should “create an environment conducive to diplomacy.”129 
 While foreign policy scholar Greg Bruno’s article “Washington’s Diplomatic 
Thaw” implies a slightly diplomatic shift in the U.S’ behavior towards Iran, whereas 
Kupchan and Takeyh argue that Washington’s behavior of attempting to contain and 
isolate Iran is failing as “Iran Just Won’t Stay Isolated.” Bruno’s argument is not that the 
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United States policy has necessarily gone soft, but rather that “pragmatism appears to be 
driving Washington’s maneuvering” because of the actions of the Bush Administration 
that imply a “courting of historical foes.”130 Kupchan and Takeyh make an opposing 
argument and state that the Arab allies to the United States refuse to isolate Iran. Rather, 
Arab states see open dialogue and taming Iran will eventually bring regional 
cooperation. The authors see the Gulf Cooperation Council as an ideal framework for the 
United States to encourage “a cooperative regional security order,” as envisioned by the 
U.S.’s Arab allies, which will lead to the reduced Iranian threat.131 
 The Council on Foreign Relations conducted an interview with Gary Sick, 
former staff member at the National Security Council, and asked him if a deal could 
possibly be in the works between the United States and Iran. In the interview, Sick 
explains that even after thirteen years of sanctions, Iran has not stopped expanding 
nuclear capabilities. Sick also addresses the Israeli threats about attacking Iran claiming 
that not only are they nearly impossible to carry out alone, but that they would also 
jeopardize the relationship between the United States and Israel as an Israeli attack on 
Iran would inevitably drag the United States into war as well. The interview concludes 
with Sick stating that the United States need to take a more realistic approach about how 
many centrifuges are spinning and the delusion that Iran would agree to stop all 
centrifuges.
132
 
 Prior to the Presidential Election of 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations 
evaluated where the importance of foreign policy stands with regards to the American 
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people as voters. In his article, “Little Discussion of Foreign Policy,” Richard Haass, 
President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning at 
the Department of State, explains that the American people believe that the economic 
recession and other domestic issues take precedent over foreign policy in the 2008 
election. Haass also states that American voters believe the possibility of going to war 
with Iran is no longer a threat as per the published National Intelligence Estimate on 
Iran’s nuclear program.133 
 Despite the belief of some Americans that the threat of Iran’s nuclear program 
decreased, the scholars at CFR would disagree. In September of 2008, mere weeks 
before the 2008 Presidential Election, the Council on Foreign Relations conducted a 
three day program dedicated to Iran and the policy options the incoming President of the 
United States may take with Iran. In session one, scholars Ali Ansari, Farideh Farhi, and 
Lee Cullum debate the internal leadership of Iran where they discuss the difference 
between previous regimes, current ones, and possible regime shifts in the future.
134
 In 
session two, panelists discuss the nuclear dimension and Iranian foreign policy. Like 
many articles already published by CFR, scholars debate on the likelihood of and 
capabilities of an Iranian nuclear threat and the position this places the United States and 
her allies in. 
135
 Session three is devoted to formulating options for the upcoming 
administration. First, the panelists begin with stating the most likely goals of the 
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incoming administration including the restraining Iranian power and containing Iran’s 
nuclear program. The panelists also discuss the influence of Iran in the Middle East and 
the success of policy towards Iran thus far. There seems to be somewhat of an agreement 
amongst the panel on the overall unrealistic policies so far, with an exception of the 
human rights foreign policy agenda towards Iran which Takeyh describes as “part of the 
dialogue with the Iranians.” The panelists also agree that the proper course to take with 
Iran is not one of isolation and intimidation, but one of diplomacy and soft power.
136
 
5.2.2: 2009 through 2010 
 By the beginning of 2009 and the election of President Barack Obama, many 
scholars were examining the threats posed by Iran and the possible courses of action the 
new administration may take. In his article, “A Nuclear Iran: Live and Let Live, or Die 
Another Day?,” Richard Haass gives policy options for the Obama Administration 
towards Iran. The first is similar to that of North Korea which is that of living with the 
threat. The second option presented by Haass is an attack by the United States, Israel, or 
both on the nuclear facilities in Iran to destroy their nuclear capabilities. This option, 
however, will inevitably result in retaliation on the United States by Iran which could 
result in the loss of many lives and extensive damage to the world economy. Haass’ 
solution is to present Iran with a diplomatic package that offers “Iran access to nuclear 
energy but not physical control over nuclear materials.” While he is skeptical of Iran 
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accepting such a package, Haass urges President Obama to make another attempt at 
diplomacy with Iran.
137
  
 In an article in the Foreign Service Journal posted on CFR.org, Robert 
McMahon, foreign relations specialist, discusses the issue of democracy promotion—
that is true promotion of democracy versus the Bush Administration’s “Freedom 
Agenda.” McMahon summarizes recommendations made by foreign policy experts who 
support democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective. Some of these 
recommendations include taking a realistic approach to democracy promotion in the 
Middle East, drawing a distinction between regime change and democracy promotion, 
not using military power in the name of democracy promotion, and establishing more 
modest goals for promoting democracy.
138
 
 In an interview with Bernard Gwertzman, David Albright, President of the 
Institute for Science and International Security, states that he believes Iran may achieve 
capability to create a nuclear weapon by 2009. Like other scholars, Albright believes this 
not only poses a serious threat to the United States but to her allies as well. When asked 
how the United State should react if Iran was willing to talk but refusing to negotiate on 
their nuclear program, Albright responded that an important goal for the United States to 
maintain is Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment. In addition, he also stated that it 
is essential to negotiate with Iran and bring in other key plays of importance to the 
United States and Iran. Bringing in more key players is the key to striving for a Middle 
                                                          
137 Richard Haass, “A Nuclear Iran: Live and Let Live, or Die Another Day?” Council on Foreign Relations (2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/nuclear-iran-live-let-live-die-another-day/p18209. 
138 Robert McMahon, “A Brave New World on Democracy Promotion,” (Foreign Service Journal, January 2009), 38-
39.  
 60 
 
East without nuclear weapons.
139
 There are some scholars who doubt the threat of Iran 
achieving a nuclear weapon. Frank Procida, a National Intelligence Fellow, makes the 
argument that while Iran may have the capacity to create a nuclear weapon, they are not 
likely to use it as it would result in more devastation and destruction for the Iranians 
themselves. Procida argues that the rhetoric used by Obama on Iran’s nuclear capability 
is similar to that of his predecessor and that the international community should not fear 
Iran’s nuclear capability any more than any other country with nuclear weapons.140 
 Scholars Gerson and Hertog are nervous of the policy toward Iran the United 
States had established by early 2009 calling it both cautious and confused because of the 
mixed signals regarding urgency the administration has sent. On one hand the 
administration acknowledges the capabilities of Iran due to their sufficient stockpiles of 
low-enriched uranium. On the other hand, members of the administration are stating that 
Iran is not close to creating a weapon. This confusion, according to Gerson and Hertog, 
will neither persuade nor intimidate Iran.
141
 
 In a similar regard, Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus of CFR, establishes that the 
United States is at a crossroads, one in which it can either choose to continue to assert 
US power on crises where the U.S. is weakest or choose to play to its strengths by 
building allies. Gelb suggests that the U.S. needs to redefine its own power and strengths 
and seek relationships with other powers because it will help the U.S. gain stability in its 
foreign policy.
142
 Richard Haass makes a similar argument stating that a change is 
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indeed needed in US foreign policy and encourages the US to work with other 
governments democratic or otherwise.
143
  
 Many scholars also commented on the presidential election in Iran in 2009 and 
analyzed how this may bring about changes in the United States. In an interview with 
Greg Bruno, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, foreign policy scholar, is asked about the impact of 
economic sanctions on Iran. Djavad states that he doesn’t really know what the effect of 
sanctions or the tightening of sanctions because there are many ways to get around 
sanctions. He tells Bruno that he sees sanctions as an ineffective tool to affect 
international relations or relations with Iran.
144
  
 Gary Sick argues that the United States should tread with caution in its policies 
towards Iran after the stolen election. In an interview with Bernard Gwertzman, Sick 
states that it is clear that beginning negotiations or discussions with Iran will be more 
difficult and complicated after the stolen election and coup in Iran. Sick urges the 
Obama administration to behave cautiously because there is a series of domestic 
problems the U.S. must overcome.
145
 Bruno and McMahon also suggest that the Obama 
Administration be careful of offensive language because it prompts speculation about the 
Obama Administration’s ability to engage Iran.146 
 Michael Zenko, a fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at CFR believes 
that the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran is highly likely. In his argument, Zenko 
gives three examples of when Israel saw “Iranian nuclear weapons [as] an existential 
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threat, [and it became] deaf to entreaties from U.S. officials to refrain from using 
military force.” Zenko predicts that if Tehran refuses to bargain away its nuclear 
capability, an attack from Israeli, with or without U.S. permission, is likely.
147
  
 As tensions continue to rise through the end of 2009 and into 2010, so do the 
different policy options presented by scholars. Several scholars present the abysmal 
human rights abuses in Iran as an important aspect that should factor into US foreign 
policy making. In an interview, scholar Ali Ansari says the West should be more upfront 
in confronting the human rights violations occurring in Iran. Ansari argues that the West, 
specifically the United States should not see Iran only in terms of its own security of the 
security of Israel. Rather, the West should be making a statement about “certain values 
and certain aspects of basic human dignity that should be upheld.” Ansari says the 
Obama administration should not be afraid to speak out on unacceptable violations of 
human rights occurring in Iran.
148
 
 Ray Takeyh takes the human rights argument one step further by saying the 
Obama administration should “take a cue from Ronald Reagan and persistently 
challenge the legitimacy of the theocratic state, and highlight its human rights abuses.” 
By using systemic language to condemn human rights abuse, Takeyh argues that Iran 
will be forced to take domestic issues just as seriously as international issues such as 
nuclear capability. Much is said and done by the US to hold Iran responsible for its 
                                                          
147 Micah Zenko, “Israel Has Iran in its Sights,” Council on Foreign Relations (2009), http://www.cfr.org/israel/israel-
has-iran-its-sights/p20109.  
148 Ali Ansari, “Time to Speak Out on Iran,” Interview by Bernard Gwertzman, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 
January 2010.  
 63 
 
nuclear obligations, the US, as the longest standing democracy in the world, is failing at 
hold Iran accountable for its human rights obligations.
149
 
 In an interview with CFR, Rudi Bakhtiar, the Director of Communications at the 
International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, Rudi calls the human rights record of 
Iran “excruciating,” especially after the protests. Rather than being able to peacefully 
protest an unwanted regime, Iranians are being fired upon, jailed, and killed. Bakhtiar 
asks that “the outside world must continue to apply pressure on Iran and hold this 
government accountable for its unacceptable human rights record and violations of 
international treaties it has voluntarily signed.”150 
 The use of force continues to be an option discussed by scholars. In the article 
“The Force Needed to Contain Iran,” James Lindsay, Senior Vice President at CFR, and 
Ray Takeyh say if Iran is to acquire nuclear weapons, it would take a considerable 
amount of American skill to contain Iran. The authors believe that “Washington would 
need to be explicit about its red lines: no initiation of conventional warfare against other 
countries; no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material or technologies; no stepped-up 
support for terrorist or subversive activities. Washington would need to be just as 
explicit about the consequences of crossing those lines: potential U.S. military retaliation 
by any and all means necessary.”151 
 Leslie Gelb disagrees that force is a considerable option for Iran. In the article 
“The Wrong Way on Iran,” Gelb argues that there is a better US policy to solve the 
Iranian crisis that does not involve military force. This solution is to “strengthen our 
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friends in the Gulf region and try to weaken the Revolutionary Guard regime with quiet 
and practical persistence.” Gelb says this would include the following: “continuing to 
bolster the legitimacy of friendly regional governments plus very public upgrades of 
U.S. capabilities to defend them, as the Obama administration is doing with missile 
defenses, proceeding with sanctions against the Revolutionary Guard, and continuing to 
try to sabotage Iran’s uranium-enrichment and other nuclear programs as well.”152 
 Senior fellow Walter Russell Mead, while agreeing that military strikes against 
Iranian nuclear facilities are not a good idea, he believes that all options must be 
discussed. Mead states that if Iran were to attack the United States, the United States 
would retaliate and this would lead to a full on war—a war in which Iran will suffer and 
be subject to regime change. Mead does not support the Obama administration making 
hotheaded threats towards Iran, but rather suggests they quietly communicate to Iran 
“that an attack on the forces of the United States would be an act of suicidal folly.”153 
 Sanctions also continue to be a topic of discussion in 2010. Former Deputy 
National Security Advisor on Iraq and Afghanistan Meagan O’Sullivan states that in 
order for sanctions to properly work, two conditions must be met. The first condition is 
“whether the sanctions regime is structured in a way that is conducive to the goals that 
are being pursued.” The second condition is whether or not there are other foreign policy 
tools in place that could aid/support sanctions such as incentives. O’Sullivan says that if 
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sanctions alone are not successful, they may come to the aid of other foreign policy 
options such as military force or containment.
154
 
5.2.3: 2011 to Present 
 Beginning in the fall of 2011 and up until the present time, the field of foreign 
policy has been flooded with articles and different policy options for the US’s foreign 
policy towards Iran. In an article titled “The March Toward a Nuclear Iran,” Ray Takeyh 
explains that “Iran’s scientific infrastructure has grown in sophistication and capability 
in the past two decades,” and Takeyh estimates that within a period of only a few years, 
Iran will be able to detonate a nuclear device.
155
 This estimation makes scholars uneasy 
and caused them to search for viable policy solutions. Scholar Madison Schramm urges 
the United States to engage Iran and push for cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Schramm states that Iran is nuclear capable, not nuclear armed, 
and is thus still able to cooperate with the IAEA and not violate the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Schramm also believes that Obama’s increased sanctions 
have failed and that a military option would only delay Iran’s nuclear abilities. Rather, 
Schramm calls for more incentives from the Obama administration to contain a nuclear 
Iran, rather than attempt to prevent it.
156
 
 Foreign Affairs contributors Sarah Morgan and Andrew Apostolou argue that 
Obama should highlight human rights abuses in Iran as a foreign policy strategy. These 
scholars argue that the only way to neutralize Iran is to “exploit the regime's main 
vulnerability: its false claim to legitimacy.” The best way to do this, according to the 
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authors, is to place pressure on Tehran by supporting its dissidents and highlighting 
human rights abuses on the world stage. This will expose the hypocrisy within Iran and 
hopefully result in domestic change from within.
157
  
 There is currently a debate amongst scholars as to whether or not it is a good 
time to attack Iran. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Matthew Kroenig, nuclear security 
fellow at CFR, argues that a surgical strike on Iran is the “least bad option.” Kroenig 
believes that a nuclear Iran will pose a threat not only to the US and Israel, but that it 
would also limit US freedom of action in the Middle East. In addition, Kroenig believes 
deterring Iran will inevitably result in a nuclear exchange with Israel which will place 
the US in the middle of a nuclear war. Kroenig suggests that Washington conduct 
surgical air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and destroy them which will greatly 
damage and slow Iran’s nuclear ambitions. He goes as far to suggest means to avoid 
collateral damage limit the extent of Iran’s retaliation. Kroenig’s bottom line? Attack 
now before it’s too late. 158 Eric Edelman et al. also present an article that makes a very 
similar argument to that of Kroenig stating that “United States faces the difficult 
decision of using military force soon to prevent Iran from going nuclear, or living with a 
nuclear Iran and the regional fallout.”159 
 Scholars on the other side of the debate are seriously concerned with the possibly 
of an attack on Iran. Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro believe there are three major 
flaws present with Matthew Kroenig’s argument to attack Iran. They are: “First, its view 
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of Iranian leaders' risk calculations is self-contradictory. Second, it misreads nuclear 
history. And third, it underestimates the United States' ability to contain a nuclear 
Iran.”160 Rather, the authors suggest that the United States should learn from the 
mistakes with North Korea and not preemptively attack Iran, but rather, live with the 
possibility of a nuclear Iran.
161
 
 Colin Kahl, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, contradicts 
the article published by Matthew Kroenig in his article titled “Not the Time to Attack 
Iran.” Kahl says there are many flaws in Kroenig’s argument stating that there is not a 
hurry to act immediately and that Kroenig’s timeline is misleading. Kahl also attacks 
Kroenig’s underestimation of Iran’s retaliation of an attack on its facilities, as well as an 
inaccurate estimation of minimizing spillover. Kahl concludes that while the Obama 
administration is not taking the option of using force off the table, it should remain a last 
resort and not a first option as its consequences are grave.
162
 Scholars Jamie M. Fly and 
Gary Schmitt believe the United States is seeking a regime change but that this will not 
happen easily. Fly and Schmitt believe that a military attack may result in a regime 
change, but only by an attack that would eliminate the current regime, not just wound it. 
Therefore, the authors believe that a military option should remain on the table and may 
be used if necessary.
163
 
 Military options are not the only ones being discussed. In her article “Obama’s 
Counterproductive New Iran Sanctions,” Suzanne Maloney, former US State 
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Department Policy Advisor, argues that the increased sanctions will only result in a more 
determined nuclear Iran. Maloney believes that what really needs to be examined is 
realistic way in dealing with the leadership of Iran. Maloney believe the new sanctions 
eliminate all prior hope of engagement and the prospect of negotiations. By doing so, the 
United States has backed itself into a corner because it is essentially seeking regime 
change in Iran as it is unwilling to work with the current leadership.
164
 
 Lastly, Hossein Mousavian, Iranian policy maker and scholar, argues that the 
actions of the Obama administration have ben contradictory to what they originally set 
out to do. Rather than engage Iran, the Obama administration has been really seeking a 
regime change. Mousavian argues that “the door to rapprochement is closing,” and if the 
US every wishes to engage Iran it should do the following: declare that it does not seek a 
regime change and show goodwill. Doing so will keep the door open for engagement 
and a healthier relationship between Iran and the United States.
165
 
5.3: Collection Sample Two: The Brookings Institution 
 The Brookings Institution was founded in 1916 by Robert S. Brookings and other 
government reformers who were devoted to creating an organization which conducts 
fact-based study of national policy issues. It was first known as the Institute for 
Government Research and later merged with its two sister schools, the Institute of 
Economics and a graduate school to become what we now know as Brookings 
Institution. Since its inception, the Brookings Institution has carried out its mission to 
“promote, conduct and foster research in the broad fields of economics, government 
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administration and the political and social sciences.”166 As a nonprofit public policy 
organization, Brookings continues to conduct research and provide recommendations for 
policy makers.  
5.3.1: Prior to 2009 
 The policy research sample from the Brookings Institution, hereby referred to 
simply as Brookings, begins in 2007 with an article by Suzanne Maloney titled “Fear 
and Loathing in Tehran.” Maloney, one of Brookings’ policy experts on Iran explains 
how the foreign policy goal of the United States towards Iran for many years has been an 
attempt at regime change with the ultimate end goal being democracy promotion. 
Mahoney explains how over the years the United States has committed a series of 
blunders that only result in fear and loathing, and these blunders have only lead to 
deeper suspicions in Tehran that the ultimate goal of the United States is to eradicate the 
Islamic Republic. Maloney makes two suggestions for the incoming administration 
based on the mistakes of the past: accept that regime in Iran is here to stay and accept 
that US involvement will most likely impair rather than advance an attempt at 
democracy in Iran.
167
 
 Maloney suggests that the best policy for the United States is to engage Iran. In 
an article written in 2007 by Maloney and Ray Takeyh, the suggestion given to policy 
makers is that engagement should be the primary thrust to American foreign policy in 
order to restrain and redirect Tehran’s dangerous policies.168 In a lecture given to the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform National Security and Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on the reality of the situation in Iran, Maloney attributes the 
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failure of United States policy towards Iran to a severe lack of understanding about the 
Iranian regime. She offers five possible suggestions for a diplomatic way forward with 
Tehran. “First, and most importantly, a successful American approach to Iran must 
acknowledge that diplomacy is the only alternative available to U.S. policymakers… 
Second, diplomatic engagement is an appropriate and potentially effective tool for 
addressing our deep differences with Tehran…Third, modest pressure is unlikely to 
produce dramatic changes in Iranian policy or its leadership’s strategic 
calculus…Fourth, a broad international coalition is the best vehicle for exerting external 
influence on Iran…Fifth, containment is a viable alternative strategy, if ultimately 
second-best.”169 
 On February 21, 2008, Suzanne Maloney appeared before the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom and gave a lecture titled “Advancing 
Religious Freedom and Human Rights in Iran.” In her lecture, Maloney addressed 
different policy options towards Iran based on advancing religious freedom and respect 
from human dignity.  
 In discussing human rights and religious freedom in Iran, Maloney frames her 
argument in context of the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the 
detrimental impact it has had on Iran’s political and social environments. According to 
Maloney, Ahmadinejad’s regime has resulted in censorship of books and other media 
intensifying dramatically, Islamic dress codes and other social prohibitions strictly 
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enforced, and the targeting of intellectual, dissidents, student activists, lawyers, union 
leaders, and human rights advocates for repression and imprisonment.
170
 
 Maloney explains that under the Iranian regime, religious minorities are being 
poorly treated. Despite the so called protection and guarantees of political representation 
offered to religious minorities in post-revolution Iran, the truth that they are not 
protected. Thousands of minorities fled during the revolution, and as for the minorities 
that remain, some are denied basic rights to practice their faith, their educational 
opportunities are limited, and many have been imprisoned. As of 2008, the latest US 
strategy for Iran was to give Iran an option to choose between moderation or isolation. 
While this strategy did initially receive international consensus, Maloney argues that it 
has failed to achieve its aims due to the “misinformed assumptions about Iran and the 
region that senior American officials nurtured even in the face of contradictory 
evidence.”171 
 The solution to the current problems with Iran that Maloney presents are the 
same as those present in the article “Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences,” where 
she restates her five suggestions to a diplomatic way forward in Iran. She does, however, 
make a few additional points regarding human rights stating that engagement does not 
mean that the US should no longer criticize Tehran’s abuses of its citizens’ rights. 
Rather, Maloney calls on the US to speak up for greater social, political, and economic 
liberalization in Iran as well as a condemnation of the regime’s repression. In order to 
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promote human rights and religious freedom in Iran, the US must not continue to seek a 
regime change, but rather, retool democracy promotion programming in Iran.
172
 
 The Center for a New American Security published a policy paper written by 
Suzanne Maloney titled “Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran: How Tehran 
Might Respond.” Maloney argues that the biggest challenge for US policy makers is an 
inadequate understanding of Iran and once again states that the key to a diplomatic 
process is the ability and willingness on behalf of the enemies of Iran to accept a level of 
ambiguity in Iran’s undertakings.173 Maloney remains optimistic that if the United States 
is willing to learn from the past, the relationship between Tehran and Washington may 
be improved. By “devising an effective formula for engaging Tehran, and maintaining 
momentum, [the United States may be able to find] mechanisms that succeed in drawing 
in a leadership that is insular and profoundly suspicious of Washington.”174 
5.3.2: 2009 through 2010 
 Debates over the best policy options for United States policy towards Iran 
continue in 2009. In an article titled “Misreading Tehran,” Suzanne Maloney explains 
that the Unites States gravely miscalculated the political dynamics in Iran which resulted 
in erroneous assumptions that would begin after the 1979 Iranian revolution and 
continue until present day. These misperceptions became even more evident in light of 
the June 2009 election in Iran. Maloney argues that while many scholars were studying 
how the election would affect the balance of power within Iran, many could not foresee 
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the impact that defiance of the supreme leader or the mass protests would have on 
Iran.
175
 
 The author gives four points—or lessons learned—from the situation that 
transpired in Iran post-2009 election. First, the belief that supreme leader, Ayatollah Al 
Khamenei is a relative moderate—a balancer, if you will—proved to be false after he 
aligned himself with Iran’s conservatives and fully supported hard-liner, President 
Ahmadinejad. Second, Iran’s representative institutions, which were once believed to be 
legitimate, proved to be a means for manipulation in the elections, elections which were 
manipulated in order maintain the Iranian regime’s control and stability. Third, many 
observers once believed that as a result of “revolutionary fatigue and political cynicism,” 
Iranians were not willing to participate in any political movement. In light of the massive 
movements, this notion proved to be false.  Finally, and perhaps the most relevant to this 
case study, Maloney argues that the economy isn’t Iran’s primary vulnerability. She 
suggests to policy makers to understand that the economy is not what spurred uprisings 
in Iran, but rather, the desire for democratic, basic human rights sparked the unrest.
176
 
 In her testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on developments in 
Iran after the June 12, 2009 election, Suzanne Maloney addresses the internal turmoil 
occurring in Iran and offers suggestions for ways in which US foreign policy towards 
Iran may move forward. Maloney argues that the unrest in Iran further strengthens the 
Obama administration’s policy for diplomacy is the best policy to be used towards Iran. 
The worst policy alternative would be military action which would only result in a more 
unstable Middle East and most likely strengthen Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Maloney 
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remains a supporter of engaging Iran as she sees the splintering regime in Iran to become 
more problematic for the United States. She sees the intensification of sanctions as 
necessary only when engagement fails because economic pressures alone rarely result in 
substantive modifications to Iranian policy.
177
 
 Maloney continues to remain critical of sanctions towards Iran. In an article 
written by Maloney and Takeyh, “Sanctions Will Not Curb Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” 
the authors explain that while the new United Nations Security Council sanctions against 
Iran passed on June 9, 2010 are a significant achievement for the Obama administration, 
they doubt that the sanctions will actually be able to deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The 
passing of the new round of sanctions, which places curbs on the conventional arms 
sales, are argued by the authors to be the major development themselves. The success of 
the sanctions, however, remains to be proven as Iran will continue to seek nuclear 
capability.
178
 
 In his article, “Iran Sanctions: Who Really Wins?,” Djavad Salehi-Isfahani 
explains how the Obama administration’s policy of engagement is actually similar to 
that the old policy of “carrot and sticks” as the focus of the US has shifted to Iran’s 
economy.
179
 Salehi-Isfahani argues that “the emerging consensus in Washington that 
new, ‘crippling’ sanctions could persuade Iran to change its nuclear policy seems in part 
based on the lack of a better alternative.”180 The author says this statement is based on 
two incorrect assumptions being made in Washington: first, that the weak economy in 
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Iran is a result of existing sanctions, and two, said weak economy resulted in the 
demonstrations of June 2009. Similar to previous arguments made by Maloney, the 
author states that the Iranian economy was not the cause of the demonstrations, but 
rather a desire for better living standards and way of life was. Rather than hurting the 
regime of Iran, the author argues that the main victim of the sanctions will be the lower 
classes who will suffer the most, and their suffering will not weaken the Iranian 
government. Lastly, the author argues that engagement may be the most reasonable 
approach to Iran as it may inspire an interest in non-proliferation (assuming here that 
Iran is as close to nuclear capability as it claims). If the US can emphasize positive 
inducements, it might shift Iran’s role from military to economic development by 
encouraging building infrastructure.
181
 
 In an article by Martin S. Indyk, former US Ambassador to Israel, and Kenneth 
M. Pollack, former CIA analyst and National Security Council staff member, the authors 
argue that the Obama administration is faced with a new set of complex challenges in the 
Middle East, one of which is curbing Iran’s nuclear problem. Indyk and Reidel believe 
that as of 2010, the Obama administration had made more progress with Iran than did 
the Bush administration due to its ability to enact a new approach towards Iran.
182
 
However, there is much still to be done. The Obama administration was quick to adopt 
an engagement policy which includes “carrots and sticks.” The problem, however, is that 
within months of adopting said policy, disputes over the June 2009 election occurred. 
These disputes led to the increased power of an already hard-liner regime. Despite 
international support, the authors find it unlikely that increased sanctions towards Iran 
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will convince the Iranian regime to suspend its uranium enrichment program. In 
addition, the United States has been lacking in condemning the violent repression and 
consistent violation of human rights by the Iranian regime in hopes that this will result in 
Tehran seeking compromise. However, avoiding increasing pressure on Iran’s violation 
of human rights in hopes of engagement with the regime is leading the Obama 
administration nowhere.
183
 
 Some scholars have been more vocal in the criticizing the direction that US 
policy is headed towards in Iran. In their article, “Do Not Even Think About Bombing 
Iran,” Michael E. O'Hanlon, senior fellow, and Bruce Riedel, former CIA analyst and 
counterterrorism specialist, argue that a long-term strategy for dealing with nuclear Iran 
is needed and it should not be limited to military action. While not fully convinced about 
the current effectiveness of sanctions, the authors argue that the strike option lacks logic 
because while a massive strike may slow down Iran’s nuclear progress, it will not be for 
long. Not only will a strike be technically difficult, but it will also most likely to 
strengthen the hard-line, anti-West regime of Tehran. The best way forward is a three-
pronged approach according to the authors: sanctions, deterrence, and containment. If 
sanctions are restructured properly, they may evolve into a containment strategy for a 
nuclear Iran which could work as a nuclear umbrella to Israel and other US allies similar 
to that of the containment strategy for the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
184
 
5.3.3: 2011 to Present 
 In a lecture given to the House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland 
Defense and Foreign Operations, and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
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Suzanne Maloney comments on the progress of the Obama administration towards Iran 
as of November 2011. She begins with assessing the Obama administration’s policy and 
says that on one hand, it deserves recognition for seeking engagement with Iran. In 
reality, however, the Obama administration has used policy tools used by the previous 
administration of George W. Bush —sanctions. Maloney believes this is not unexpected 
as it is difficult to shift from diplomacy during the Clinton administration, to absolute 
isolation under the Bush administration, and back to diplomacy again with Obama.
185
 
She also states that “despite some stylistic differences, the Obama administration has 
retained the second-term Bush policy framework for Iran. The designation of Iranian 
individuals and institutions under the counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism statutes 
remains a powerful tool for creating ripple effects across the global landscape of the 
country’s trade ties.”186 Maloney also criticizes the sanctions put in place by the Obama 
administration claiming they have only heightened paranoia in Tehran.  
 Maloney concludes her lecture by offering five ways in which the United States 
can have a more successful foreign policy agenda towards Iran. By doing so, the United 
States has the possibility to make actual progress towards Iran. Maloney states: 
First, multilateral cooperation is vital to influencing Iran’s bottom line as 
well as its strategic decision making…Second, Washington must 
recognize—and must articulate clearly to both its diplomatic partners and 
to the American people that—that tough measures toward Tehran will 
entail tough tradeoffs for U.S. interests…Third, Washington should never 
unilaterally take diplomacy off the table…Fourth, the use of force must 
remain within the universe of policy options for dealing with any urgent 
threat, but the intemperate invocation of threats does little to advance 
U.S. interests or those of the international community in ensuring a 
peaceful, prosperous Middle East… [and lastly], Washington should 
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rethink the universe of possibilities for advancing political change within 
Iran.
187
 
 
 Another subject of debate amongst scholars is the role Israel plays in the foreign 
policy of the United States towards Iran. Bruce Riedel’s “Will Israel Really Strike Iran?” 
analyzes Israel’s growing threats of a possible attack on Iran. Riedel argues that if Israel 
were to attack, Iran and its allies in the region would have the means to retaliate, and it 
would not only hurt Israel, but the US as well. Iran and its allies would be able to carry 
out an attack on US bases in Gulf States as well as attacks on American diplomats. 
Riedel suggests that regardless if there is any validity in the threats made by Israel, 
President Obama should quietly inform Israel of the dangers and foolishness of a strike 
against Iran.
188
  
 Dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Vali Nasr, in 
his article, “Dangerous Mix: Iranian Oil and U.S. Sanctions,” warns of the dangers of 
further pressuring Iran with sanctions. In December of 2011, Iran threatened that it will 
retaliate against President Obama’s newly proposed sanctions on Iranian oil by closing 
the Strait of Hormuz where one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through daily.189 Nasr 
explains that US strategy assumes that by cutting Iran out of the oil market, Saudi Arabia 
will compensate for the loss. According to Nasr, this assumption is a problem because it 
is not clear whether or not Saudi Arabia would actually increase production, which 
would have detrimental effects on the world economy. Iran threating to shut down the 
Strait of Hormuz is an attempt to intimidate the US away from the new sanctions. Nasr 
believes the behavior of the US and Iran will eventually lead to a war if not as a result of 
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military action, then as a result of sanctions that will end up accelerating the path to 
war.
190
 
 As a policy expert on Iran, Suzanne Maloney continues to provide analyses as 
well as suggestions for policy makers. In light of the increasing tensions between Iran 
and the United States in the winter of 2011, Maloney wrote an article titled “How to 
Contain a Nuclear Iran.” Many of the arguments presented by Maloney are similar to 
those presented earlier in this collection sample. Maloney says that neither the Obama 
administration nor the possible Republican candidates running for president in 2012 
offer a logical solution to Iran. Over the years, there has been growing support for 
simply “dealing” with a nuclear Iran, and while this is a possible solution, Maloney 
warns that it makes negotiations and concessions difficult. She also argues that even 
though the original policy objectives of President Obama have veered off course and rely 
on increasing pressure, she maintains that engagement should and must continue. 
Negotiations without trust are extremely difficult, but Maloney also says they are 
necessary in order to keep the tensions from escalating. 
191
 
 Maloney then takes her argument one step beyond simple diplomacy and says 
that the Obama administration must reassess its approach towards Israel. The 
administration must be able to differentiate between Israel’s legitimate fears and its 
empty threats as well as provide new measures that reassure Israeli leaders of the 
American commitment to Israel. Maloney is telling policy makers that they should not 
abandon Israel, but they should encourage Israel to refrain from using inflammatory 
language that will only heighten tensions. Finally, Maloney concludes that Washington’s 
                                                          
190 Ibid.  
191 Suzanne Maloney, “How to Contain a Nuclear Iran,” Brookings Institution (2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0305_nuclear_iran_maloney.aspx   
 80 
 
policy toward Iran should be to continue to attempt to deter their nuclear capability as 
well as deter the influence of the current regime.
192
 
 Marvin Kalb, news analyst for Fox News, is also worried about the tension 
between Iran and the United States and whether or not this will lead to confrontation. 
Kalb explains how the United States, in response to the Iranian threats to close the Strait 
of Hormuz, has threatened to take military action. This response has led to statements 
made by the United States government that imply if Iran crosses this “red line,” military 
action will be taken, and all the while Iran continues with their nuclear program. Kalb 
argues for caution in actions and words saying that Iran and United States are headed 
towards an ugly confrontation and now is the time to attempt to diffuse the situation.
193
 
 The Brookings Institution also provides policy analysts with polling results and 
analysis. In an article titled “Do Israelis Support a Strike on Iran?” by senior fellow 
Shibley Telhami, it is revealed that while the Israeli government is willing to initiate a 
strike against Iran with or without US backing, the Israeli people feel different. 
According to a poll conducted by Telhami “only 19 percent of Israelis polled expressed 
support for an attack without U.S. backing…while 42 percent endorsed a strike only if 
there is at least U.S. support, and 32 percent opposed an attack regardless.”194 Telhami 
also states that Israelis remain confident that the US will support them, or even join them 
in combat on Israel’s behalf.195 
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5.4: Collection Sample Three: American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
 In 1939, the American Enterprise Association (AEA) was formed by a group of 
business in New York in response to the growing threat of Congress making wartime 
price and production controls permanent in order to avoid another economic depression. 
Faced with this threat, the group founded AEA in order to advocate “rapid postwar 
economic demobilization” and to shed light on the consequences of the decision by 
Congress on the economy.
196
 By 1943, AEA opened an office in Washington, DC and 
became known as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI became the result of “the 
migration of business and trade associations from commercial centers to the nation's 
capital and the emergence of the policy ‘think tank.’”197 Since its inception, the 
American Enterprise Institute continues to serve an important role in providing research 
and informing policy debates.  
5.4.1: Prior to 2009 
 The collection sample for the American Enterprise Institute begins with an article 
by Reuel Marc Gerecht, a resident fellow at AEI, titled “U.S. Must Be Firm with Iran.” 
In his argument, Gerecht begins with analyzing the involvement of Iran in the US war 
with Iraq and challenges the notion that Iran wants stability in Iraq. He explains that the 
US can continue to exercise “soft power—through sanctions, resolutions, diplomatic 
isolation, and rougher rhetoric,” towards Iran but that it will not change their radical 
tactics, especially in Iraq.
198
 What the United States really needs to do is take a firmer, 
harder approach towards Iran. 
                                                          
196 “History of AEI,” American Enterprise Institute (2012), http://www.aei.org/about/history/.  
197 Ibid.  
198 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “U.S. Must Be Firm with Iran,” American Enterprise Institute (2007). 
http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/us-must-be-firm-with-
iran/.  
 82 
 
 AEI scholar Joshua Muravchik is also worried of the strength of Iran. In his 
article, “Iran Bomb ‘Intolerable,’” Muravchik believes there are only two options for the 
US: accept Iran with nuclear weapon or destroy its nuclear program by force. The idea 
of a nuclear capable Iran is unacceptable, so Muravchik suggests to policy makers that 
they take a realistic approach and rely on hard power. Regardless of whether or not 
Tehran would use a weapon against the US or an ally, just having nuclear capability 
strengthens Iran’s ability to dominate the Middle East and poses a severe threat to the 
US. The only way to prevent this would be to launch a pre-emptive military strike 
against Iran.
199
 
 In an article titled “Iran's Nuke News Shows Danger of Trusting This Regime,” 
resident scholar Michael Rubin explains how based on the last National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE), the Democrats are convinced that Iran does not pose a threat to the 
United States. He believes this assumption to be wrong and says diplomacy, without any 
use of strong sanctions or threat of military force, is useless. Rubin questions the 
capability of Democrats to properly assess the threat posed by Iran and wishes that they 
were willing to truly understand the danger of a nuclear Iran.
200
 In another article on the 
rose colored foreign policy of the Democrats, Rubin states that he Democrats were quick 
to criticize the Bush administration’s decision to go to war with Iraq, yet they are 
delusional about the current threats the United States faces. He says that by projecting 
“good will” towards the US’s enemies, Democrats “undermine containment and 
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deterrence, the very strategies necessary to prevent war.”201 He also criticizes Obama’s 
call for a diplomatic surge with Iran, a statement that was made the same day President 
Ahmadinejad boasted about Iran’s nuclear program calling Obama a naïve optimist.202 
 The influence of Israel on the policy decisions of the United States is also a 
matter of debate amongst scholars. In his article, “America’s Ally in the Middle East,” 
former economic speech writer for President George W. Bush David Frum says that the 
US support of Israel is not the work of a conspiracy or the Israeli, but rather Americans 
see Israel as an ally amongst enemies. Frum traces the relationship of the United States 
and Israel back to Israel’s inception and shows American support of the Israeli through 
polls conducted since 1948. Despite all the different variations in the polls, they reveal 
that overall the American public strongly supports the state of Israel. Frum also explains 
that after the attacks of 9/11, many Americans began to see Arabs as the “enemy” and 
became convinced that Israel and United States should continue to be strong allies. He 
concludes his argument saying that if the enemy were to “disavow genocide, eschew 
religious extremism, halt terrorism, adopt democracy, practice tolerance, and offer and 
accept reasonable compromise” there would be no need for conflict.203 
 Reuel Marc Gerecht asks what to do with the growing tension with Iran in his 
article, “Countering Iran.” He says Iran’s nuclear program is continuing and the option 
of a military strike that was once possible vanished when the NIE released its report 
saying Iran had stopped seeking a nuclear weapon. Upon the publication of this report, 
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Iranian leadership was quick to celebrate the success of Iran over the West and stir up 
trouble all over the Middle East, a ploy that Gerecht believes will eventually lead to a 
confrontation between Iran and Israel. The author then asks the United States to do all it 
can do to broadcast the crimes committed by Tehran against its own people in order to 
arrest members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in order to make public the crimes of Iran. 
By doing so, the United States can turn its focus toward Iran and hopefully prevent the 
Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
204
 
5.4.2: 2009 through 2010 
 Many analysts argue that the Obama administration is a continuation of Bush’s 
second term. John Bolton, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and Internal 
Security under President George W. Bush, first defends the conservative ideals on 
foreign policy and national security and says that these policies are actually what the 
country needs. The problem, according to Bolton, is veering from these core 
conservative principles which he says are necessary in order to maintain the security and 
freedom of the American people. Former President George W. Bush veered away from 
these principles in his second term, and President Obama outright rejects them. This is 
causing the foreign policy of the United States to be far more than just lenient but almost 
downright dangerous. Bolton argues that President Obama is unable to establish the 
difference between an ally and adversary—as evident by his invitation of the likes of 
Iran to Fourth of July reception—which will prove to be disastrous when Iran has 
nuclear capability.
205
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 In an article titled “What if Israel Strikes Iran?,” John Bolton explains that in 
light of the upcoming presidential elections, there remains much speculation about a 
possible Israeli attack on Iran in order to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Bolton believes 
that Israel is at serious risk due to the increasing capabilities of Iran in addition to the 
Obama administration’s growing distance from Israel. He gives six possible scenarios 
that could result from a possible Israeli attack on Iran. They are the following: Iran 
closes the Strait of Hormuz, Iran cuts its own oil exports to raise world prices, Iran 
attacks U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran increases support for global terrorism, 
Iran launches missile attacks on Israel, or Iran unleashes Hamas and Hezbollah against 
Israel.”206 Bolton believes that all of these scenarios are highly dangerous, but just as 
dangerous is the notion of a nuclear armed Iran. In addition, due to the growing distance 
between Israel and the Obama administration, Israel may be in a slightly more difficult 
position with the US if it were to decide to attack Iran.
207
 
 In an article titled “Thoughts on Obama and Iran,” conservative political analyst 
Michael Barone expresses his deep frustration with the Obama administration’s policies 
towards Iran saying they have been “toothless.” Barone explains how Obama has been 
consistent in his policy approach towards Iran because in 2007 he was willing to meet 
with Ahmadinejad without any preconditions. In addition, Barone believes that Obama’s 
willingness to approach Iran shows his willingness to “mollify evil regimes.”208 Barone 
accuse President Obama of appeasing the Iranian regime in hopes that it will abandon its 
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nuclear goals which he sees next to impossible because the regime has rejected 
negotiation attempts by other American administrations. Finally, Barone argues that 
what is needed is regime change in Iran and that the only way this is even remotely 
possible is if the Obama administration condemns the actions of Iran and deems them 
illegitimate.
209
 
 John Bolton also explores the possibilities of sanctioning Iran in his article 
“Sanctions Won’t Work Against Iran.” In response to the IAEA’s report which 
downplays Iran’s continued nuclear ambitions, President Obama is faced with two 
options. First, he has the option of simply characterizing the freezing of Iran’s nuclear 
program as a success, but this solution will not stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The second 
option for the Obama administration would be to enforce stronger sanctions on Iran 
including petroleum sanctions as well as international finance sanctions. While Bolton 
claims these sanctions indicate progress on behalf of the Obama administration and may 
result in dissatisfaction from the Iran regime, he does not actually believe they will have 
any impact as of the current time. He gives several reasons for why these sanctions will 
have no impact including the unlikelihood of the UN Security Council passing sanctions, 
the lack of resolve from the EU with regards to Security Council decisions, and Iran’s 
continued efforts to protect its petroleum products According to Bolton, Iran is fully 
aware of the sanctions and is not “standing idly by.” Rather, the government of Iran is 
preparing by increasing refineries and expanding existing facilities as well as increasing 
subsidies for natural gas. Bolton concludes that sanctions will not have a significant 
impact and that the Obama administration is finding yet another way to avoid making 
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“hard decisions” on whether or not to use force towards Iran’s growing nuclear 
capabilities. 
210
 
 The American Enterprise Institute also conducts public opinion polls to assess 
the success of the current administration. Public opinion analyst Karlyn Bowman 
analyzes the latest polls on foreign policy in an article titled “Leave Foreign Policy to the 
President.” According to the polls as of July 2009, President Barack Obama has a 50% 
to 55% approval rating on foreign policy. Approximating 61% of people polled believe 
he is taking the proper steps towards Iran, while other polls indicate that 35% to 40% 
believe he is not being tough enough and 10% see Iran as a serious threat.
211
 Polling also 
revealed that while Americans primarily focus on domestic issues and leave foreign 
policy issues to the president, they are still paying attention to Iran. For this reason, 
Bowman says it is up to President Obama to be more assertive in his discussions on 
foreign policy. In another poll conducted by Pew in September of 2009, Bowman found 
that “82% percent said Iran developing nuclear weapons would be a major threat, 12% a 
minor one and 2% not a threat.”212 
 In an article written on striking Iran, John Bolton argues that amongst the Obama 
administration, there seems to be disagreement as to how to deal with Iran and Bolton 
claims that Obama’s two-track policy is not working. He says Obama needs to decide 
what steps he will be taking towards Iran because he is currently switching between 
applying pressure on Iran and keeping the door of communication open, both of which 
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have the long term goal of a regime change. Bolton argues that the US, and particularly 
the Obama administration, needs to stop using “sanctions” and “pro-democracy” rhetoric 
as an excuse for its inaction. Rather, it must take a decisive military plan against Iran in 
order to destroy their nuclear program.
213
 
 David Frum presents a contradictory argument to the one present by Bolton in his 
article “Don't Start Bombing Iran Just Yet.” Frum takes a pragmatic approach to 
addressing Iran stating that Iran was quick to reveal its current nuclear progress for two 
possible reasons: the program may not be going well or they might be trying to provoke 
a strike. Frum presents the possible damage that could result from an attack on Iran 
including a long, drawn out war, a spike in oil prices, and possible retaliation for Iranian 
allies. In addition, Frum argues that when assessing attacking Iran, Iranian public 
opinion must be taken into consideration because the ideal solution in Iran would be a 
regime change. However, this regime change can only be brought by the Iranian people 
and this is not likely to occur if the Iranian public opinion of the US is extremely 
negative. Frum believes that caution is necessary when discussing military options and 
that the best solution for Iran would be gasoline sanctions.
214
  
 Michael Rubin argues for keeping options on the table when dealing with Iran. In 
his article “Containment Won’t Work,” Rubin explains that the United States does not 
have the capacity to contain Iran nor is deterrence an ideal solution. Instead, while 
acknowledging that it would best serve as a last resort, Rubin says that policy makers 
must keep a military attack on Iran as an option while bearing in mind the consequences 
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of a military attack.
215
 Overall, Rubin is pessimistic that anyone will actually be able to 
stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon for several reasons. First, diplomacy is not 
an option as the Iranians are unable to genuinely negotiate. Second, the US is most likely 
unwilling to launch a strike on Iran, and third, Israel does not have the ability militarily 
to attack Iran.
216
 
5.4.3: 2011 to Present 
 In February of 2011, AEI’s Karlyn Bowman presented new polling information 
on the foreign policy of President Obama. According to a January 2011 poll on how 
President Obama is handling foreign policy conducted by CBS and the New York 
Times, President Obama has a 46% approval rating and a 32% disapproval rating. In a 
February 2011 Gallup poll on the same topic, Obama has a 48% approval rating and a 
45% disapproval rating. When asked how the public feels about how Americans feel 
about promoting democracy abroad 19% thought it was “very important,” and 26% felt 
it was “not important.” Lastly, when polled on which is more important for Obama to 
focus on, 78% of Americans would rather he focus on domestic policy versus 11% that 
believe he should focus on foreign policy.
217
 By November of 2011, Bowman analyzes 
some other polling figures taken from Gallup, CBS, Times Mirror, and Pew. With 
regards to United States involvement in foreign affairs versus domestic affairs, the 2011 
poll found that 76% of Americans polled find that the US should concentrate more on 
national problems and strengthen the US. When asked about Iran, an overwhelming 55% 
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felt that the threat of Iran can be contained by diplomacy versus the 15% that believes 
Iran is a threat that must be dealt with now with military action.
218
 
 Research fellow Thomas Donnelley’s article “War with Iran,” states that the 
United States is already in a low-level war with Iran that is destined to escalate. 
Donnelley is critical of the policy “pundits” who continue to support covert action 
because this will only further intensify the situation. Donnelly calls for the policy makers 
and the Obama administration to face reality in that the US cannot handle a larger war 
because they are not prepared by any means—diplomatically, militarily, or domestically. 
The current administration should learn from the misjudgments of the past and not begin 
a war they cannot finish.
219
 
 In December of 2011, the American Enterprise Institute published a policy paper 
by fellow Thomas Donnelly, Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies 
Danielle Pletka, and scholar Maseh Zarif titled “Containing and Deterring a Nuclear 
Iran.” In this research paper, the authors thoroughly examine and analyze the costs of 
containment and deterrence as foreign policy options towards Iran, options the authors 
say may be forced upon American decision makers. They argue that little in depth 
research has been conducted that truly measures the costs of containment and 
deterrence.
220
 They created a containment policy for Iran based on the Cold War which 
addresses the following: the blocking of Iranian expansion in the region, highlighting the 
nature of the Iranian regime, transforming the regime in Tehran, and of course, 
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consistent diplomacy. In addition to establishing a concrete containment strategy, this 
concrete containment policy must also incorporate deterrence. However, adopting 
containment and deterrence has costs to US nuclear policies, calls for a significant force 
around Iran’s perimeter, and will result in high diplomatic, strategic, and military 
costs—costs that most policy makers are ignoring.221 
 The discussion on sanctions continues into 2012 with an article by John Bolton 
titled “On Iran, Sanctions Not the Answer.” Bolton once again criticizes the Obama 
administration for its naïve approach towards diplomacy and sanctions in Iran. He also 
believes that Obama’s secondary plan to sanction Iran is also “misguided” because the 
Iranian regime does not believe in the US’s ability to deter. This leaves the US with only 
one option: military attack on Iran.
222
 
 Bolton also is vocal about the support the United States should give to Israel. In 
his article, “Israel is Not the Threat, Mr. Obama. Iran Is,” Bolton is extremely critical of 
Obama’s weakening support of Israel and current distanced relationship between the 
long term allies. He explains that Iran continues to seek a weapon and continues to be an 
impending threat to the state of Israel. Rather than support its close ally, the Obama 
administration has gone as far as to leak information about possible Israeli attacks on 
Iran.
223
 Bolton also believes that the ultimate goal of Iran is a complete nuclear 
Holocaust, and therefore, there are only two options: live with a nuclear Iran or militarily 
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destroy its capabilities.
224
 Therefore, it seems ridiculous that the US would ever stand in 
Israel’s way, who may be willing to take the steps that the Obama are too afraid to take.  
5.5: Collection Sample Four, Center for American Progress 
 The newest of all the research institutions used in this case study, the Center for 
American Progress (CAP) is an independent, nonpartisan research institution which 
builds the progressive ideas and actions of innovators such as Theodor Roosevelt and 
Martin Luther King. Created in 2003 by John Podesta, the Center for American Progress 
“develop[s] new policy ideas, critique[s] the policy that stems from conservative values, 
[and challenges] the media to cover the issues that truly matter.”225 The Center of 
American Progress contributes to the world of policy making by conducting research, 
hosting debates, and initiating dialogue between leaders and citizens in hopes of creating 
a more open and free society.
226
 
5.5.1: Prior to 2009 
 The collection sample for the Center for American Progress begins with a public 
opinion snapshot by CAP Senior Fellow Ruy Teixeira who examines the opinions of the 
American public based on recent polling information to that of policy experts. In this 
snapshot, Teixeira found that both experts and the American public agree that diplomacy 
is the proper course with Iran. According to the poll, 57% of Americans believe that the 
only way to contain Iran is thorough diplomacy whereas only 15% see military action as 
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an option and 20% do not see a threat posed by Iran. Containment and engagement seem 
to be both what the American public as well as policy experts suggest.
227
 
 With regards to policy experts’ suggestions for engagement and containment, 
President of Ploughshares Fund Joseph Cirincione and Senior National Security Analyst 
Andrew Grotto published a policy paper titled “Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for 
Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran.” Prior to giving what the policy analysts see as 
their best option for dealing with a nuclear Iran, they provide some research into the 
background of the Iranian nuclear program as well as some insight into the Iranian 
regime. After stating the implications for US national security, the authors describe 
several policy options for Iran. These options include: maintaining the status quo, a 
regime change, air strikes against nuclear facilities, a grand bargain, and containing and 
engaging. A containment and engagement are meant to do several things including 
breaking the stalemate that currently exists, opening lines of communication, eventually 
create political change, as well as kick start security, political, and nonproliferation 
initiatives.
228
 
 In “Think Again: The Bush Legacy: Flailing and Failing the World Over,” 
scholars Eric Alterman and George Zornick criticize the Bush administrations’ foreign 
policy towards many countries in the world. With regards to the situation in Iran, the 
authors explain how Iran is a problem now more than ever as a result to Bush branding 
Iran an “axis-of-evil” and to the resulting isolationist foreign policy towards Iran. Rather 
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than offering diplomacy, President Bush uses brute force and strength—constantly 
waving the big American stick.
229
 
 In a public opinion snapshot by Ruy Teixeira conducted in mid-2008, the public 
was asked for its opinion on whether or not it would be acceptable if the President of the 
United States met with the President of Iran. They indicate that 59% of the American 
public polled believes it is a good idea to meet with Iran in comparison to the 39% who 
disagree. In addition, Americans were asked which approach towards Iran is best—
military action or diplomacy and/or an economic approach, 73% favored diplomacy 
and/or an economic approach.
230
 
 In a report published by The Century Foundation titled “Democracy Promotion 
in the Middle East and the Obama Administration,” CAP scholar Brian Katulis addresses 
the possible hesitation of President Obama wanting to promote democracy in the Middle 
East due to the previous administration’s manipulation of democracy promotion. Katulis 
argues that abandoning promoting democracy would not only be detrimental for the 
United States, but that it would also contradict the core values of Obama’s campaign 
platform.
231
 Katulis’ report analyzes the Middle East, assesses the previous foreign 
policy actions in the Middle East, and concludes with suggesting core priorities for 
promoting democracy in the Middle East. These core priorities are taking tangible steps 
to restoring U.S. credibility, increasing diplomatic efforts in order to promote national 
consensus in important countries and address conflict in the Middle East, developing an 
integrated approach to supporting democracy and government reform, increasing 
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positive incentives for democratic reform, and building a diversity of financial support 
for democracy promotion.
232
  
5.5.2: 2009 through 2010 
 The transition between the Bush administration and the Obama administration 
has been a point of interest for researchers. CAP Senior Fellow Larry Korb gives 
suggestion to President Obama with regards to Iran based on the behaviors of the 
previous administration. First, Korb argues that Obama must be aware of a few events 
that have shaped the Iranian opinion towards the United States. For example, the role of 
the CIA in the removal of Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran’s only democratic leader, 
resulted in the harsh regime of the Shah. In addition, President Bush’s labeling of Iran as 
an “Axis of Evil,” in spite of Iran’s condemnation of the attacks of 9/11 and its support 
to the United States during Afghanistan, resulted in bitterness. Lastly, in 2003, the 
Iranians extended a hand to the Bush administration with the goal of beginning direct 
negotiations to which the Bush administration never responded. These three events will 
make approaching Iran more difficult, but Korb argues that it is necessary in order to not 
only attempt to reconcile difference, but also to gain international support.
233
 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs Spencer P. Boyer and visiting scholar Rammy Salem, in their article “Obama’s 
Perfect Pitch on Iran,” argue that despite the criticism of Obama’s policy by critics, the 
president is actually doing exactly what he should be doing. As a result of the corrupt 
elections in Iran in 2009, President Obama’s response has be criticized by both 
American conservatives who accuse of him of being timid in responding to the Iranian 
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corruption, as well as the Iranian government which has excused President Obama of 
meddling. Luckily, according to the authors, neither accusation is correct nor is either 
accusation sticking. Rather, the president has found a clever way to focus on the extreme 
human rights violations rather than the political outcome of the election as a means to 
reinforce the United States’ stanch towards Iran which the authors believe is both 
pragmatic and should continue.
234
 
 Policy analyst Peter Juul also comments on the recent elections in Iran stating 
that the stance taken by the United States must remain firm despite the accusations being 
thrown at it. In his article, “The Iranian Conundrum,” Juul explains how the United 
States is faced with the question of how well diplomacy is working as a strategy for the 
Obama administration in light of the Iranian corruption as well as the upcoming 
withdrawal from Iraq. The author also explains how the regime in Iran, now faced with a 
multitude of domestic problems, may attempt to point the blame at the United States or 
even shut the United States out. However, due to Iran’s complex relationship with Iraq 
and the regional security issues involved, the Obama administration should not eliminate 
the possibility of talks with Iran, even if they seem to be going nowhere.
235
 
 Human rights violations in Iran continue to be a point of discussion for foreign 
policy analysts. In an article titled “Rebranding U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” scholars at the 
Center for American Progress state that some Iranians fear that the United States prefers 
regional security to democracy, and the scholars argue that the time is ripe for the United 
States to live by example. In light of the gasoline sanctions passed on Iran by the US 
Senate which mainly will impact an already struggling civil society, the authors explain 
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that the best foreign policy approach for the Obama administration is to remained 
focused on human rights efforts. The logic presented is two-fold. First, a focus on human 
rights is more transparent than a policy that attempt so to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
Second, by focusing on human rights and supporting civil society, the US may be able to 
“rebrand” its image to the Iranian people, which may be the exact push that is needed to 
seek change themselves.
236
 
 In an article titled “Thinking Ahead on Iran,” scholars Brian Katulis and Peter 
Juul explain the new round of sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States. The 
authors are unclear of the effectiveness of the sanctions as they seem to not have an 
impact on Iran’s nuclear program, but rather, on its people. Katulis and Juul argue for a 
continuation of Obama’s dual-track strategy of engagement and isolation with Tehran 
because it offers the right amount of pressure and engagement. Another option would be 
for the Obama administration to go beyond the sanctions. If it were to do so, the authors 
call for complete support from Congress on Obama’s policies in order to reduce the 
threat of a nuclear Iran.
237
 
 In November of 2010, the Center for American Progress put out a publication 
titled “The Power of the President: Recommendations to Advance Progressive Change,” 
in which many different scholars, fellows, and analysts from CAP offer suggestions to 
the president on many different issues and policies. With regard to foreign policy, and 
especially with regards to Iran, scholars suggest that President Obama focus on pursing a 
dual-track policy on Iran with specific emphasis on human rights issues. They suggest 
the Obama administration continue to diplomatically engage Iran, even if Iran continues 
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to refuse the administrations overtures because this will raise international consensus on 
Iran’s nuclear program. By remaining committed to diplomacy, continuing to highlight 
human rights abuses, cutting down on discussing the military option, and making media 
and anticensorship tools available to Iranian democracy activists, i.e. supporting civil 
society, the Obama administration can hope to bring about a level of change between the 
United States and Iran.
238
 
5.5.3: 2011 to Present 
 The last portion of the collection sample for the Center for American Progress 
begins with an article by Matthew Duss, Director of Middle East Progress at CAP, titled 
“Corralling Iran.” In his argument Duss explains how the newly released report, United 
Nations experts believe that the UN sanctions passed in June of 2010 have proven to be 
“having a significant impact on Iran’s ability to proceed with its nuclear program 
[because the new measures] are containing Iran’s procurement of items related to 
prohibited nuclear and ballistic missile activity and thus slowing developing of these 
programs.”239 According to Duss, the success of the sanctions is yet another achievement 
in President Obama’s engagement policy with Iran. While running for office in 2008, 
President Obama was willing to talk to Iran without any preconditions in attempts to 
affirm “tough, direct diplomacy with Iran.” In addition, President Obama believed that 
even if sanctions were not to be successful, they would at least strengthen the US’s 
ability to “form alliances to impose tough sanctions.”240 Duss argues that since Iran is 
working hard to evade these sanctions, it is essential that the Obama administration, now 
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more than ever, continues to work in multilateral venues to maintain and enforce the 
sanctions.
241
 
 In an article titled, “Diplomacy, Not Military Force Should Be Our Track with 
Iran,” Matthew Duss encourages policy makers to think twice before propagating the use 
of military force. In light of an assassination attempt on the Saudi Ambassador, many 
analysts were quick to recommend immediate military action. Duss refutes their 
recommendations by saying that due to President Obama’s diplomatic strategies, Iran is 
much weaker now than when he took office. The success of the international sanctions 
on Iran and the heightened awareness on human rights violations and resulting 
investigations have increased international pressure on Iran and weakened Iran’s 
economy. Duss recommends that the Obama administration continue with a diplomatic 
approach towards Iran because not only has it been successful, but also because based on 
the polling information available, the last thing Americans want is another war.
242
 
 Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy Rudy deLeon 
and fellow Brian Katulis also support and encourage the current foreign policy approach 
of the Obama administration towards Iran. In their article, “Taking the Iranian Nuclear 
Threat Seriously,” the authors believe that the successful approach adopted by the 
Obama administration is grounded in three main components: “Unprecedented defense 
cooperation with regional allies that enhances their security and independence, an 
international coalition that holds Iran accountable for its actions, and smart, targeted 
economic sanctions.”243 After explaining each component a little further, the authors 
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state that the challenge in the coming years for the United States is to strike a right 
balance between using the diplomatic tools it has. President Obama should continue to 
work diplomatically and multilaterally to maintain stability.
244
 
 The possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran continues to be a point of debate 
amongst scholars. Brian Katulis believes that the United States must discourage Israel 
form attacking Iran because diplomacy and sanctions are the best course of action 
currently. Even if Iran continues to acquire nuclear capability, intelligence estimates 
show that this is not likely to happen for at least another year. In addition, President 
Obama’s current strategy of implementing sanctions and utilizing diplomacy is working, 
and any attack by a close ally of the United States would jeopardize this success. 
Therefore, it is in the best interest of the United States to urge Israel to tread cautiously 
and not to behave unilaterally.
245
 
 Even though members of the Israeli government may support a military strike on 
Iran, that does not mean that the Israeli citizens would agree. In a public opinion 
snapshot, Ruy Teixeira explains that when both Americans and Israelis were polled, 
there was not much support for an Israeli attack on Iran. In a poll conducted by the 
University of Maryland, only 19% of Israelis polled believe in a unilateral strike against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities. In addition, 34% polled do not believe in a strike at all. A 
CNN/ORC poll yielded similar results with only 17% of Americans supporting a 
military strike and 60% supporting diplomatic and economic affairs.
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 In April of 2012, the Center for American Progress published a policy paper 
written by Rudy deLeon, Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Matt Duss, Ken Sofer titled 
“Strengthening America’s Options in Iran.” In light of the all the possible options the 
United States has towards Iran, the authors argue that before a decision can be made on 
what foreign policy strategy is best fit for dealing with Iran, the right questions must be 
asked. The authors then propose that the Obama administration, when attempting to find 
a due course of action, be willing to address these key factors:  
What are the best estimates on the transition time from research and 
development to weapons production in Iran’s current nuclear program? 
What are the best estimates of Iran’s efforts to transition its research and 
development program into a weapons program with a delivery system 
suitable for operational use? What are the current consequences of 
sanctions and other measures against Iran’s nuclear program?  What is the 
current impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy? What capacity exists to 
boost oil deliveries to countries now dependent on Iranian oil in the event 
Iranian oil shipments are not available? What is the status of commercial 
and military access to international waters in the Strait of Hormuz? Does 
Israel have the military capacity to go it alone in any military action 
against Iran? What links already exist between Iran and Middle East 
terrorist groups, and how might these groups react to an Israeli attack on 
Iran? What might the negotiations between Iran and P5+ 1 countries (the 
United States, Russia, China, England, France, and Germany) produce? 
What additional diplomacy is required?
247
 
 
 The authors provide deep and thorough analysis using facts and figures to answer 
these questions. Even though there is no easy answer for them, it is essential that these 
questions be addressed because in light of all the policy options available, it’s better to 
ask now than later.
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.1: Restating the Question 
 The research of this thesis is aimed to better understand the relationship between 
policy research and policy outputs, in particular, it attempted to work within existing 
frameworks to help link policy research and policy outputs by examining the role of 
think tanks as domestic factors of influence on foreign policy in the United States. In 
order to do so, this thesis asks the following questions:  Can think tanks contribute to 
foreign policy decision making? If so, due to their expanding nature, can think tanks be 
seen as a domestic source of influence on United States foreign policy? Furthermore, 
due to the complexities and dual nature of foreign policy decision making, what 
revelations can be made about the relationship between think tanks and other sources of 
domestic influence?  
 In order to examine the relationship between research institutions and policy, a 
case study was created using executive orders issued by President Barack Obama and 
collection samples created from four policy research institutions. First, an analysis is 
given of what executive orders reveal about the foreign policy of Barack Obama. 
Second, similarities between the policy research/suggestions and actual policy decisions 
will be listed which will determine the extent of the contribution think tanks offer 
foreign policy decision makers. In addition, four charts are included which summarize 
the policy recommendations from each think tank. Third, some observations and 
conclusions about the dynamics of domestic influences on think tanks will be examined. 
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6.2: What Do Executive Orders Reveal About the Foreign Policy of 
President Barack Obama? 
 Four executive orders, issued by President Barack Obama, were used as means to 
measure policy outputs for this thesis. The first executive order used, Executive Order 
13553, was concerned with human rights violations in Iran citing a list of people as 
complicit in human rights abuses. The second and third executive orders used Executive 
Orders 13574 and 13590, respectively, further extend sanctions on Iran as well as add 
new sanctions that place even further restrictions on Iran. Finally, as of February 06, 
2012, President Obama issued another executive order which blocks government 
property of the Government of Iran as well as blocks the Central Bank of Iran. Upon 
further examination, a few observations can be made regarding what policy outputs 
reveal about foreign policy in the United States. First, human rights are an important 
cornerstone of United States policy, and as such, they are significant to the foreign 
policy approaches taken by the United States. Second, as sanctions are a foreign policy 
tool used as a means of diplomacy, President Barack Obama is using a diplomatic 
approach towards Iran, which according to the research provided, is in line with the 
diplomatic approach on which he campaigned for president. Third, economic measures, 
while remaining a tool of diplomacy, when increased, can be used as a means of 
providing pressure. Fourth, as all of these executive orders build on a previously issued 
act or order, foreign policy should be seen as a continuation, bearing in mind that while 
the policies may vary from one administration to another, there are historical patterns 
that can be observed.  
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6.3: Similarities between Policy Research and Policy Outputs  
 As direct impact is nearly impossible to calculate, this thesis measures influence 
of research institutions by examining the similarities between what is suggested by 
policy analysts and experts to that of the actions taken by President Obama vis-à-vis the 
four executive orders used. The collection samples from each think tank will be analyzed 
first with regards to similarities between the policy suggestions and the policy actions 
taken. This part of the analysis seeks to show if each think tank was able to predict 
changes and offer foreign policy options that meet this changes in policy. More 
importantly, what themes and/or policy suggestions arise more than others and how do 
these themes manifest as policy outputs, if at all? The observations presented in the 
previous section are important because they indicate which policies and strategies have 
been adopted by the Obama administration towards Iran. In order to establish a link 
between policy outputs and policy research, the analysis of the collection samples looks 
for the foreign policy approach taken by the Obama administration which has revealed 
itself to be diplomacy, and the different tools that fall under diplomacy such as 
sanctions, engagement, protection of human rights/upholding democratic ideals, to name 
a few. If similarities can be found between policy research and policy outputs, influence 
of think tanks on foreign policy decisions may be established. 
6.3.1: The Council on Foreign Relations  
 The collection sample from the Council on Foreign Relations began in 2007 and 
continues up to present day. The collection sample provides much research on the 
different trends in foreign policy as well as provides many possible solutions for the 
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policy makers to utilize. Several themes and/or policy options dominate this collection 
sample, and can be grouped into two major categories: diplomacy and military force.  
6.3.1.1: Diplomacy 
 Many scholars, dating back to 2007 support diplomatic efforts as a policy 
towards Iran. Using the term “diplomacy” implies several policy options which include 
sanctions, engagement, and human rights advocacy/democracy promotion. Sanctions and 
diplomacy were presented as an option by Michael A. Levi who argued that sanctions 
and diplomacy—“stick and talks”—were the only way forward with Iran. Meagan 
O’Sullivan argues for sanctions, along with proper goals and incentives, as a diplomatic 
tool to be used towards Iran. O’Sullivan believes that even if they are not successful, 
they can at least aid to other diplomatic tools. Leslie Gelb also makes this argument for 
sanctions but takes it one step further arguing that in addition to sanctions, the US must 
use diplomacy to strengthen allies in the Gulf region which may weaken the 
Revolutionary Guard regime. 
 Many scholars in CFR argue that engagement is the best policy to be taken 
towards Iran. Ray Takeyh argues for the cessation of threats towards Iran and calls for 
an environment conductive for diplomacy. In an argument by both Takeyh and Kupchan, 
both scholars call on engaging through the Arab states. By building better relations with 
the Arab vis-à-vis the Gulf Cooperation Council, the authors believe the Iranian threat 
can be reduced. In a panel conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations specifically 
for policy options for Iran, scholars agree that diplomacy and soft power, rather than 
intimidation, are the best options for Iran.  
 Many CFR scholars argue for a reassessment of US strategy towards Iran. David 
Albright argues for negotiations with Iran and for the bringing in of other key players. 
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Leslie Gelb and Richard Haass also call for better relations, and both scholars find the 
diplomatic solution to lie within creating better relations with Iran as well as other non-
democratic states.  
 Other strategies towards engagement have been provided by the CFR scholars 
including Madison Schramm, Suzanne Maloney, and Hossein Mousavian. Schramm 
asks the administration to engage Iran but to do so by pushing for Iranian cooperation 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Schramm also argues for more 
incentives to entice Iran rather than military action or increased economic sanctions. 
Maloney argues against increased sanctions and believes the United States need not 
work towards a regime change, but rather engagement. Mousavian argues that the door 
for engagement is closing, and like Maloney, believes that the only way to keep this door 
open if for the United States to claim that it does not actually seek a regime change in 
Iran. 
  Human rights and democracy promotion also fall under the category of 
diplomacy and were suggestions given by many scholars at the CFR as a way to proceed 
with Iran. In a publication by the American Jewish Committee which was hosted by 
CFR, Ari Friedman and Maxine Kaye point out systemic violations by the Government 
of Iran and call for international condemnation. Ali Ansari echoes this sentiment and 
believes that the West should not be afraid to speak up and be more upfront in 
confronting human rights abuses in Iran. In an interview with CFR, Rudi Bakhtiar 
highlights the excruciating human rights record in Iran and asks the outside world to 
place pressure on Iran and hold the government of Iran accountable for the violation of 
human rights and the violation of international treaties. Sarah Morgan and Andrew 
Apostolou take the human rights argument one step further by arguing highlighting 
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human rights abuses may be the key to neutralizing Iran. They argue that by exposing 
the serious human rights violations in Iran, the hypocrisy of the regime may be exposed 
and its legitimacy may be lost. 
 Similar to the argument for human rights is the argument for democracy 
promotion. Robert McMahon argues for true democracy promotion in Iran. He says the 
United States should draw a distinct line between regime change and democracy 
promotion, neither of which should involve any sort of military. Ray Takeyh also 
supports a foreign policy based on human rights and says the United States should 
highlight human rights abuses because as the longest standing democracy in the world, it 
has an obligation to place pressure on Iran. 
6.3.1.2: Military Force 
 The second major category for policy options is the use of military force towards 
Iran. Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations are torn on the issue of military force 
as some seem to be in support of hard power as a military option while others do not. 
James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh explain that if Iran was to attain a nuclear weapon, red 
lines would need to be created. If these red lines are crossed, force may be used. Walter 
Russell Mead, while not advocating for a direct military strike, says it may be necessary 
and that all options should be considered. However, Mead does say to render caution 
when using inflammatory language and threats. 
 Several scholars at the CFR suggest a direct military strike on Iran. Matthew 
Kroenig argues that now is the best time for a military strike on Iran. He believes that the 
threat posed by Iran is imminent, and the only solution is to surgically remove Iranian 
nuclear facilities. Kroenig is arguing to attack now before it is too late—an argument 
that is echoed by Eric Edelman who believes attacking Iran now is a better option than 
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living with a nuclear Iran. Jamie Fly and Gary Schmitt argue for a military attack in 
order to remove the current regime.  
 There are also scholars, such as Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro that believe 
military force should be the last option utilized by the United States. They attack the 
argument presented by Kroenig and say that the United States should learn to live with a 
nuclear Iran. Colin Kahl also opposes the argument present by Kroenig and says military 
force should always be a last option.  
6.3.2: The Brookings Institution  
 The collection sample from the Brookings Institution offers a variety of policy 
options as well which vary from engagement to deterrence and containment. For the 
most part, the policy suggestions can be grouped into two categories: diplomacy and 
deterrence/containment.  
6.3.2.1: Diplomacy 
 An overwhelming amount of scholars at Brookings are in support of some sort of 
diplomatic action towards Iran. Engagement is one diplomatic tool that is suggested by 
many scholars. Suzanne Maloney argues that the US must accept the regime in Iran and 
not attempt to change it. Rather, the US needs to understand that by meddling in Iran an 
attempting to change the regime, the United States will only create more loathing from 
Tehran. Her solution lies in diplomatic engagement with Iran, which both Maloney as 
well as Ray Takeyh argue should be the thrust of US foreign policy. In a lecture given to 
different policy makers in Washington, Maloney gives five diplomatic ways forward 
with Iran which include only acknowledging a diplomatic way forward, utilizing 
diplomatic engagement, acknowledging modest pressure will not result in any changes, 
forming an international coalition to exert external pressure on Iran, and utilizing 
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containment, but only as a secondary option. Even as tensions continue to escalate 
between the United States and Iran in 2011, Maloney continues to suggest engagement 
as a means to lower tensions. 
 Many scholars are opposed to increased economic sanctions and would rather 
rely simply on engagement. Maloney and Takeyh believe sanctions alone will not curb 
Iran’s nuclear ambition. This is also argued by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani who believes 
sanctions will only harm the lower class and not the actual regime. Rather, Salehi-
Isfahani argues that what is needed is engagement with positive inducements. Vali Nasr 
goes as far as to say that increasing sanctions will actually prove to be more dangerous 
as they place pressure on the Iranian regime which may eventually led to war. Finally, 
Maloney argues that increased sanctions will only result in more defensive posture from 
an already paranoid Tehran. She, once again, argues for diplomacy and multilateral 
cooperation in addition to removal of threats.  
 Human rights and democracy promotion are also given as possible policy options 
for the United States to take towards Iran. Suzanne Maloney argues that Iranian 
President Mahmood Ahmadinejad’s regime is oppressive and has detrimental effects on 
the Iranian citizens. Maloney believes that the United States has been greatly 
misinformed about Iran and what is needed is a new strategy for Iran. In addition, 
Maloney states that while the oppressive Iranian regime should be condemned, the 
United States should not attempt to change the regime, but rather, advocate democracy 
promotion. The Iranian people want basic human rights and it is this desire that will 
spark protests and bring change to Iran. The intensification of sanctions should be a last 
resort and only occur if engagement fails because Maloney does not believe that 
economic pressure alone will result in a shift in Iranian policy. Martin Indyk and 
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Kenneth Pollack also make an argument against sanctions saying that increasing 
sanctions will not stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program. In addition, they are critical 
of the Obama administration stating that it is refusing to criticize Iran’s human rights 
abuses in hopes of engagement but this has not been successful.  
6.3.2.2: Deterrence/Containment 
 Other than diplomacy, there has been one option presented by Brookings 
Institution scholars which is deterrence and containment. Michael O’Hanlon and Bruce 
Riedel argue that military should not be the only option considered with Iran. Rather, 
they suggest a sanctions policy, which if constructed properly, may evolve into a 
containment strategy. By using the Cold War as a model, the authors say that United 
States may once again be able to deter and contain a nuclear capable country. 
6.3.3: The American Enterprise Institute 
 The collection sample from the American Enterprise Institute also varies in 
policy options. Due to their conservative orientation, some of the suggestions offered by 
policy scholars echo that of the Republican Party. The policy options can be grouped 
into three major categories: diplomacy, military force, and deterrence/containment. 
6.3.3.1: Diplomacy 
 The diplomatic solutions offered by AEI scholars may be smaller in number, but 
they do in exist. One diplomatic option is given by Reuel Marc Gerecht who suggests 
that by highlighting the human rights abuses of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the 
crimes of Iran will be made public. He hopes that by highlighting these crimes, the 
United States can focus on Iran’s illegitimacy which may help prevent the Iranians from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon.   
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 Sanctions are another diplomatic policy option offered by AEI scholar David 
Frum. Frum argues that military actions should not be taken by Iran, but rather, the 
United States should take a pragmatic approach towards Iran nuclear progress. He 
pushes for gasoline sanctions as the best policy solution for the US to take towards Iran.  
6.3.3.2: Military Force/Hard Power 
 The majority of the policy options from this collection sample rely heavily on the 
use of military force and/or hard power. In argument present by Reuel Marc Gerecht, a 
more firm, hard approach towards Iran is suggested rather than the diplomatic, soft 
approach previously utilized. Joshua Muravchik is concerned about Iran’s growing 
power and believes that policy tools should be realistic. Therefore, he suggests 
destroying Iran’s nuclear program by launching a pre-emptive military strike. Michael 
Rubin is also suspicious of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and warns the US to not trust the 
Iranian regime. He believes diplomacy, without actual military force, is useless. He 
criticizes the diplomatic surge put forth by the Democrats and calls for an attack on Iran.  
 John Bolton is also critical of the democrats, and particularly the Obama 
Administration, for their inaction. He believes that using sanctions and pro-democracy 
rhetoric is an easy way out from making hard decisions towards Iran. In addition, he 
calls Obama naïve and claims sanctions and diplomacy are not working as a strategy 
towards Iran. He believes the United States needs a decisive military plan which can 
destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities. 
 Michael Rubin argues that containment will not be a sufficient strategy towards 
Iran as he is pessimistic that it will actually be able to deter a nuclear Iran. He warns of 
the consequences of military actions towards Iran, but remains confident that it should 
always be an option. Thomas Donnelley believes the United States is already in a low-
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level war with Iran and asks the Obama administration to be aware of the severity of 
situation and not to enter a war they may not be able or willing to finish. 
6.3.3.3: Deterrence and Containment 
 In a policy paper published by Thomas Donnelley, Danielle Pletka, and Maseh 
Zarif, AEI scholars present the costs of containing and deterring nuclear Iran. The 
authors argue that this has been a forced policy option as no other option seems currently 
feasible. The authors believe that the problem with containment and deterrence is that 
there hasn’t been much thorough research conducted on what it will cost the United 
States diplomatically, strategically, and militarily. The propose a containment and 
deterrence policy option based on the Cold War which will block Iranian expansion in 
the region, highlights the nature of the regime, and eventually diplomatically transform 
the regime. 
6.3.4: The Center for American Progress 
 The collection sample from the Center for American Progress, a progressive 
think tank, offers a variety of policy options that vary slightly from the other collection 
samples. There are several themes which appear from this collection sample. They can 
be grouped into the following major categories: Diplomacy and Containment and 
Engagement.  
6.3.4.1: Diplomacy 
 Once again, many policy options fall under the category of diplomacy. In the 
case of CAP, the argument for diplomacy begins with an article by Eric Alterman and 
George Zornick who criticize President George Bush’s foreign policy towards Iran 
claiming that an isolationist strategy will not result in progress. What is needed is a 
diplomatic strategy towards Iran, not a big US stick. Larry Korb also comments on the 
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failures of the Bush administration as a challenge to the Obama administration. He 
explains that the actions of the previous administration will make approach Iran difficult, 
but that it must be done in order to reconcile differences and gain international support. 
Peter Juul is also a supporter of diplomacy and argues for continued talks despite the 
seeming standstill. Matthew Duss is also a supporter for diplomatic strategies and argues 
that the strategies used by the Obama administration are working. He argues for 
continued sanctions, continued highlighted human rights abuses, and working in 
multilateral venues. Lastly, Rudy deLeon and Brian Katulis argue that President Obama 
is taking the Iranian threat seriously and that he should continue with the diplomatic and 
multilateral sanctions because they are in fact working. 
 Democracy promotion and protection of human rights both fall under diplomacy 
as well. Scholars, such as Brian Katulis, believe that Obama must make another attempt 
at democracy promotion in order to restore US credibility. He also argues for increased 
diplomatic efforts in addition to an integrated approach to support democracy. Katulis 
also calls for government reform in addition to democracy promotion to ensure a secure 
Middle East.  
Spencer Boyer and Rammy Salem argue that President Obama should continue 
to focus on the extreme human rights violations in Iran as the key aspect of his foreign 
policy. In a publication by the Center for American Progress, many CAP scholars 
address the issue of human rights and believe focusing on human rights violations in Iran 
will be a more transparent policy than one which attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
This publication also suggests that the US support Iranian civil society so to encourage 
reform and change from within the country. In addition, scholars at CAP suggest a dual 
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track policy with emphasis on human rights issues as well as continued engagement and 
diplomatic efforts.  
6.3.4.2: Containment and Engagement 
 Another policy option/theme that has emerged from the CAP collection sample is 
containment and engagement. In an article presented by Joseph Cirincione and Andrew 
Grotto, many policy options are suggested in order to deal with nuclear Iran including 
maintaining status quo, regime change, to name a few. The authors believe that 
containment and engagement are the best strategy to be used towards Iran because they 
will help break the stalemate and open lines of communication. In a similar argument by 
Brian Katulis and Peter Juul, a continuation for the dual-track strategy of President 
Obama is recommended. This dual-track strategy, which is a combination of engagement 
and isolation, is recommended because it offers the right amount of pressure and 
engagement.  
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TABLE FIVE 
Combination of Four Think Tanks 
Policy Recommendations 
     Diplomacy  Sanctions 
 
     Human Rights/Democracy Promotion 
 
    Engagement               Containment 
 
      Military Force              No Military Force 
 
      Concern for Israel             Against Sanctions 
ICON KEY 
COLOR KEY FOR THINK TANKS 
 
 Council on Foreign Relations, Center-Right  Brookings, Center-Left 
 American Enterprise Institute, Right   Center for American Progress, Left
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6.4: What Do These Similarities Mean? 
 When examining the relationship between think tanks and policy outputs, 
influence is very difficult to calculate, especially by any quantitative means. For this 
reason, this thesis defines influence by establishing the similarities between policy 
research and policy outputs. Based on the definition, several conclusions can be drawn 
from the case study presented. 
 First, based on the nature of the policy suggestions, especially prior to an 
executive order, it be can be concluded that policy experts are able to predict the 
changing course of foreign policy. As was established by the collection samples 
beginning prior to the Obama administration and leading up to present day, shifts occur 
that change the dynamic of the relationship between the United States and Iran. For this 
reason, new policy options are needed, and it is through these collection samples that 
these shifts can be detected. For example, the exit of the Bush administration and the 
entrance of the Obama administration resulted in many new policy options. This is 
mostly likely due to situational factors as well as the different foreign policy agendas 
and political affiliation of each president. As such, the collection samples were able to 
offer suggestions to President Obama based on President Bush’s record as well as 
President Obama’s beliefs.  
 Second, there are similarities in the policy suggestions offered by policy scholars 
and the policy outputs of President Obama vis-à-vis the executive orders issued. In every 
collection sample analyzed, think tank scholars recommend diplomacy, and particularly, 
a focus on human rights violations. As Executive Order 13553 indicates, President 
Obama uses human rights violations in order to designate officials responsible as well as 
 121 
 
hold them accountable. A link can be created here between policy research and policy 
outputs.  
In addition to human rights, the case for sanctions, as a diplomatic tool, can also 
be highlighted as a similarity. For example, several scholars from the Council on Foreign 
Relations argue for sanctions in addition to diplomacy as the best policies to be used 
towards Iran. This is also echoed by scholars at Brookings who believe that sanctions, if 
properly utilized, can be turned into other policy strategies. This sentiment is echoed by 
scholars at the American Enterprise Institute as well as the Center for American Progress 
where the continuation of sanctions is encouraged. This policy suggestion manifests 
itself in Executive Orders 13547, Executive Order 13590, and finally in an executive 
order issued in February 2012. These increased sanctions indicated that the Obama 
administration was set on increase pressure on Tehran, but doing so in a diplomatic 
manner, linking once again policy research with policy outputs. It can be argued that 
these similarities between the collection samples and the policy outputs do not actually 
indicate influence. However, this thesis attempts to create a link and help close the gap 
between policy research and policy outputs. As such, the similarities between the 
research provided and the policy actions taken cannot be ignored as they do indicate 
some level of impact.  
6.5: What Other Revelations Can Be Made About Think Tanks? 
 In addition to having influence on policy makers, several revelations can be made 
from the collection samples taken from the think tanks based on policy suggestions. 
Certain conclusions can be drawn about the variety of domestic influences that impact 
think tanks themselves based on the themes that can be found within each think tank. 
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These will help us better understand the most influential domestic factor on foreign 
policy.  
6.5.1: United States’ Relationship with Israel 
 Based on the policy suggestions collected from the four think tanks, the US’s 
relationship with Israel seems to be a consistent concern for research policy scholars. 
One of the suggestions that appears often in the Council on Foreign Relations is 
protection of the state of Israel. The CFR scholars, such as Gary Sick, emphasize the 
relationship with Israel and believe that Israelis actions could lead the United States into 
conflict. Michael Zenko expresses the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran, with or 
without US support. 
The Brookings Institution also values the US’s relationship with Israel. In an 
article by Bruce Riedel, the relationship between Israel and Iran is analyzed, and Riedel 
believes that the Israel is likely to strike Iran. If that be the case, Riedel urges the United 
States to quietly warn Israel that it would be in the interest of anyone to strike Iran. 
What’s worth mentioning here is that the interests of both the United States and Israel 
are seemingly identical. Suzanne Maloney, while also acknowledging the special 
relationship between the United States and Israel, also asks for American decision 
makers to differentiate between Israel’s legitimate fears and its empty threats. She 
believes the US should not abandon Israel, but rather, it should urge Israel not to use 
inflammatory language which could only heighten tensions. 
Perhaps the most adamant support of Israel can be found in the policy 
suggestions from the American Enterprise Institute. David Frum argues that Israel and 
the United States are natural allies. Israel represents friendship to the United States in an 
area like the Middle East where everyone is an enemy. Frum argues that it is only logical 
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that their interests be similar. John Bolton is worried about the increasing distance 
between the Obama administration and Israel saying that it puts Israel at further risk. 
Bolton calls for a strengthening of this relationship because Israel is in grave danger. 
Furthermore, Bolton argues that Israel may have the courage to do what the United 
States is not willing to do—attack Iran. Bolton believes that the United States must 
always stand by Israel, as they are long term allies, and that the United States should not 
stand in Israel’s way. 
Scholars at the Center for American Progress also emphasize the importance of 
the actions of Israel. Brian Katulis argues sanctions and diplomacy, the main 
components of President Obama’s foreign policy strategy, are working. He urges 
president Obama to discourage Israel from attacking Iran. Katulis argues that an attack 
by an ally to the US such as Israel would greatly jeopardize the current success of 
diplomatic efforts.  
6.5.2: American Opinion/Polling 
The second theme that emerges from the collection samples is the importance of 
American opinion. In order to gauge American opinion, think tanks conduct opinion 
polls which can be found in each one of the collection samples. In an article written by 
Richard Haass for the Council on Foreign Relations, the opinion of the American voters 
is important in order to form policy suggestions. When polled, it was discovered that 
domestic issues take precedent to foreign ones. In addition, when polled about Iran, the 
majority of Americans did not find Iran to be a threat. 
Polling is also significant to the research conducted by Brookings. In a poll 
conducted in 2012, Shibley Telhami asked Israelis if they would be willing to attack Iran 
without the support of the United States and it was discovered that only 19% of Israelis 
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polled would be willing to attack Iran without the support of the United States. It was 
also found that 32% of Israelis polled would not support an attack on Iran at all. 
Public opinion also seems to be an important aspect to creating foreign policy 
suggestions at the American Enterprise Institute. In a poll conducted in July of 2009, 
President Obama had high approval ratings, especially with regards to foreign policy and 
Iran. However, since domestic issues rank higher on what is important to Americans, it 
is advised that President Obama be more assertive in discussions on foreign policy. In 
polls conducted in 2011, President Obama continues to have a high approval rating. 
When asked about the threat Americans felt from Iran, 55% of Americans polled felt that 
the Iranian threat can be dealt with diplomatically, whereas only 15% felt that a military 
response would be necessary.  
 The Center for American Progress can be said to rely heavily on polling 
information when formulating policy strategies. The collection sample for the Center for 
American Progress begins with some polling information on the proper course to take 
with Iran. An overwhelming 57% of Americans polled believe that diplomacy is the best 
course forward with Iran. In addition, 59% of Americans believe it is a good idea to 
meet with Iran in comparison to the 39% of Americans who disagree. As the relationship 
with Israel is also of importance to policy makers, a poll was conducted which 
discovered that 34% of Israelis do not believe in an attack on Iran. In addition, 60% of 
Americans polled believed in a diplomatic and economic solution with Iran. 
6.5.3: Criticism of the Obama Administration 
 Lastly, criticism of the Obama administration seems to be a theme which 
reoccurs in the recommendations of the scholars at American Enterprise Institute. 
Scholars at AEI are critical of the Obama administration’s leadership capabilities. 
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Michael Barone condemns the Obama administration saying it is willing to mollify the 
evil regime in Iran. Barone believes regime change is only possible in Iran if the regime 
is condemned but believes this will never happen due to President Obama’s policy of 
appeasement with Iran. John Bolton also condemns the Obama administrations naïve 
policies towards Iran, stating that sanctions and diplomacy will not work in Iran. Rather, 
the Obama administration is too cowardly to making the difficult decisions towards Iran. 
6.6: What Can Be Understood from These Revelations?  
 Several conclusions can now be drawn based on the revelations that can be found 
within think tanks. First, as Israel and American opinion seem to be important aspect in 
formulating policy decisions, it can be inferred that these domestic factors of influence 
are reflected within think tanks. During the literature review portion of this thesis, many 
domestic factors of influence were discussed. These domestic factors were than linked 
back to think tanks as to show that think tanks do in fact reflect the other domestic 
factors of influence on US foreign policy. What was discussed in the literature review 
proved itself to be true based on the collection samples. Several domestic factors of 
influence such as American opinion, Democratic ideals, the role of advisers, and interest 
groups proved to be discussed and reflected within the think tanks.  
 Another factor of influence worth discussing is partisanship within the think 
tanks. While the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution are more 
moderate, the American Enterprise Institute is clearly conservative in orientation. This 
effects the policy suggestions that are put forth by scholars. For example, scholars from 
AEI are quick to criticize the decisions made by the Obama administration calling them 
naïve and weak in comparison to the Bush administration. The reverse is true with the 
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Center for American Progress. A progressive think tank, the policy suggestions from 
CAP tend to support the current administration and condemn the Bush administration. In 
addition, the policy recommendations will vary from each think tank based on their 
partisanship. It is not surprising that the American Enterprise Institute would be an 
advocate for military action, whereas the Center for American Progress commends the 
continued diplomatic efforts of the Obama administration.  
 It can be concluded that think tanks not only influence policy makers by 
recommending policy options, but they are also an optimal domestic factor of influence 
to study. Many domestic influences found within the second level of analysis can be said 
to have influence on policy makers. Think tanks are unique in that they bridge these 
different domestic factors. Within a think tank, one can find bureaucratic constraints, the 
input of Congress, democratic ideals, public opinion research, and the role of interest 
groups. It is these influences that make studying think tanks fascinating because not only 
are think tanks influencing policy makers, but they are also serving as a proxy for other 
domestic influences, making think tanks one of the most influential factors in 
formulating US foreign policy.  
6.6.1: What about Oil in the Persian Gulf? 
 While there were several revelations pulled from the collection samples, there 
was one aspect which is important to US foreign policy making which was not 
mentioned: the issue of oil in the Persian Gulf. There continues to be an increase in oil 
demand and with this increase in demand comes a fear of supply disruption. In an article 
written by Toni Johnson, the rising concern over oil shortages is discussed, especially 
with regards to Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is a waterway which 
connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea through which approximating thirty-five 
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percent of the world’s oil is shipped.249 The Gulf region, which includes Iran, is home to 
approximating sixty percent of the world’s oil reserves and forty percent of the world’s 
natural gas reserves.
250
 Iran is currently one of the world’s largest oil exporters providing 
shipments of about 2.5 million barrels of oil a day.
251
 Therefore, the impact of sanctions 
as well as the consistent threat of closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iranian officials 
should be of great concern to the United States when formulating policy. The current 
tension between Tehran and Washington not only results in increased sanctions which 
impact Iran’s economy, but they also impact the country’s long term output of oil. In 
addition, if the United States was to take military action against any Iranian nuclear 
facilities, the Iranian government would ensure a blockade of oil shipments through the 
Strait of Hormuz.
252
  
  
                                                          
249 Toni Johnson. “Oil’s Trouble Spots.” Council on Foreign Relations (2012). http://www.cfr.org/middle-east/oils-
trouble-spots/p17068. 
250 Ibid.  
251 Ibid.  
252 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
  The process of creating foreign policy in the United States is complex and relies 
on a variety of factors. The President, or Chief Executive, along with his/her 
administration and other bodies of government are responsible for creating policy that 
suits the needs of the country and American people. Truly a “dual nested game,” foreign 
policy relies on many factors, external and internal, domestic and international, in its 
formulation. 
 In addition to being a dual nested game, there is a relationship that exists between 
policy research and policy outputs when it comes to foreign policy. This thesis uses 
preexisting frameworks established by Stephen Walt and David Baldwin to highlight 
what they believe is a gap between theory, research and, policy. Research institutions, or 
think tanks, can serve as a means for closing this gap as they provide more than just 
research to policy makers. They also provide a space in which to hold debate, conduct 
interviews, and generate new ideas. Due to their expanding role in the political arena in 
the United States and in order to better understand the relationship between think tanks 
and foreign policy decision making in the United States, this thesis asks several 
questions. First, can think tanks contribute to foreign policy decision making? If so, due 
to their expanding nature, can think tanks be seen as a domestic source of influence on 
United States foreign policy? Furthermore, due to the complexities and dual nature of 
foreign policy decision making, what revelations can be made about the relationship 
between think tanks and other sources of domestic influence? 
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In order to answer these questions, a case study was created using executive 
orders of President Barack Obama and collection samples from four think tanks. The 
executive orders were chosen as a means to establish policy outputs whereas the four 
think tanks—the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, the American 
Enterprise Institute, and the Center for American Progress—were used to establish 
policy research. The aim of this thesis was to highlight a link between policy research 
and policy outputs using the recommendations of scholars at each respective think tank. 
Therefore, the collection samples gathered from each think tank reflect a variety of 
material including editorials, op-eds, policy papers, articles, debates, symposium 
transcripts, opinion polls, roundtable discussions, and guest lectures. The collection 
samples were then analyzed in light of the executive orders issued by President Barack 
Obama during his four year term. 
Upon analyzing the think tank collection samples in light of the executive orders, 
several conclusions can be drawn with regards to foreign policy, think tanks, and 
domestic factors of influence within the United States. First, based on the literature 
review conducted as well as suggestions provided by policy analysis, it can be concluded 
that the process of foreign policy making in the United States is complex. There are 
many factors and influences that contribute to the creation of foreign policy and there is 
no single decision maker in the foreign policy process. As was evident in the second or 
state level of analysis, there are a variety of decision makers in the foreign policy 
making process, and as such, the foreign policy decisions of the Chief Executive reflect 
not only his/her preferences, but also the policy preferences of his/her administration, 
Congress, and the American people. Foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum, but 
rather it is a process that continues to occur and change throughout each administration. 
 130 
 
In order to properly study foreign policy, one cannot solely study the actions of a single 
individual. Rather, one must study the actions of the decision maker in light of the 
complex policy making environment in which he/she lives bearing in mind that there are 
many constraints and influences placed on the decision maker on a daily basis. 
 Secondly, this thesis asked if think tanks contribute to the foreign policy decision 
making process, and it can be concluded that they do in fact contribute to the process of 
foreign policy making in the United States. The analysis of the collection samples with 
regards to the executive orders reveals several key points worth mentioning. First, policy 
research scholars are well versed in the field of policy making and their suggestions 
reflect years of experience as well a range of diversity that exists within the field of 
foreign policy. In addition, scholars were able to shape behavior changes in foreign 
policy and their suggestions support these changes. For example, prior to 2010, the 
foreign policy discourse was loaded with human rights policy suggestions calling for a 
condemnation of Iran’s serious violations of human rights as part of the United States’ 
policy towards Iran. As Executive Order 13553 indicates, in September of 2010, the 
Obama administration adopted a policy that would in fact highlight Iran’s violations of 
human rights. In addition to shaping changes, the collection samples indicate that there 
are similarities between policy suggestions provided by policy analysts and the decisions 
adopted by the Obama administration. There is a vast amount of recommendations 
which encourage diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy with Iran. Based on the 
executive orders of the Obama administration, diplomacy, in addition to sanctions seems 
to be the policy preference of choice. While influence of the think tanks on the Obama 
administration is difficult to prove, it is safe to say that think tanks do in fact contribute 
to the foreign policy decision making process. Furthermore, they not only provide policy 
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contributions to the President, but they also provide a significant contribution to the 
political discourse on foreign policy. As such, think tanks can be viewed as a means of 
closing the gap that exists between theory, research, and policy in the field of 
international affairs.  
 Third, it can be concluded that there is a relationship between think tanks and 
other domestic factors of influence in the foreign policy decision making process. When 
examining the revelations extracted from think tanks, several themes emerge such as the 
US’s relationship with Israel as well as the importance of American opinion. These 
revelations indicate that there are many domestic factors and/or key players who are 
influencing not only decision makers, but policy analysts within the think tanks as well. 
In addition, there is also a relationship between the partisan affiliation of the think tanks 
and the policy suggestions recommended for the Obama administration. The American 
Enterprise Institute, a conservative leaning think tank, was far more critical of the 
decisions of the Obama administration than the Center for American Progress, a 
progressive institution. Due to the their complexities as well as due to the domestic 
influences that also impact them, think tanks themselves are not only a domestic factor 
which contribute to foreign policy, but they also reflect a variety of influences 
themselves, making them not only helpful to study but also one of the most significant 
factors in foreign policy making today. 
7.1: Future Research 
 The contribution of think tanks to the field of foreign policy is vast, and while 
this thesis sheds some light on the impact of think tanks on foreign policy, it is just the 
tip of the iceberg. In order to continue towards closing the gap between research and 
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policy in addition to expanding the field of foreign policy, more research can and 
hopefully will be conducted on the topic of think tanks and foreign policy. There are two 
ways in which I would like to expand my research in the future. First, the collection 
samples used for this thesis were only from four research institutions out of hundreds. In 
the future, I would like to expand my research to include other research institutions as 
well as they may provide even more insight to the complexities of foreign policy 
decision making process. 
Second, I would like to attempt to show the influence that think tanks have on 
foreign policy decision makers. However, since proving influence will be a difficult task, 
I would like to conduct qualitative interviews with policy analysts from think tanks. 
During these interviews, I would ask them about the recommendations they have made 
for decision makers. In addition, I would attempt to find policy analysts and analysts that 
serve as policy advisors to the President and other decision makers. That way, it would 
be possible to link their policy suggestions to actual policy decisions made and in 
essence show the influence think tanks have on foreign policy.  
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